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GFNKRAL INTRODUCTION
Mankind has a desire that his wishes be fulfilled. In the
long history of attempts to control nature, the scientific meth-
od has been the most fruitful in producing satisfactory results.
However, science is not free from error; to be reminded of this,
one needs only remember discarded scientific notions such as
phlogistin, the ether, Ptolemaic astronomy, and the immutability
of the species. Furthermore, there are at present many areas of
endeavor wherein the methods of well-established sciences have
not produced such reliable theories and techniques as one has
been accustomed to expect from the physical sciences. Yet the
scientific method is an immensely more valuable tool for use in
the investigation and manipulation of nature than are the tools
of mystics, witch doctors, and divines.
All of the above tools are based upon the following belief:
"If I do so-and-so, then such-and-such will result." Philosophers
have given much of their attention to this belief, largely in an
attempt to discover how certain we can be that such-and-such will
result if we do so-and-so. As might be expected, their answers
are divergent.
It is not the business of the philosopher to find what such-
and-such and so-and-so are; that is for the scientist. The fol-
lowing question is for the philosopher: How can we be justified
in predicting the future, for all we have seen is that in the
past, so-and-so is followed by such-and-such?
The scientist will answer this question by saying that if
we know the cause then we can predict the effect, and if we should
make an untrue prediction, then we were mistaken in thinking that
we knew the cause. Therefore the scientist is perfectly confident
that the sun will rise tomorrow (barring some celestial holocaust),
but the philosopher is not so sure.
There are a number of matters which are questioned only by
philosophers. For example, a philosopher may come to the conclu-
sion that only his own mind exists, but this same philosopher will
not put his arm in a lion's cage at the zoo, for he knows that the
non-existent lion might bite it off. Such a philosophic position
well deserves the laughter it evokes. However, such positions do
serve the purpose of keeping one's mind open to a broad range of
possibilities.
The subject of this thesis is such a philosopher's specula-
tion. It would be reassuring to know that there is not the
slightest trace of doubt that so-and-so will produce such-and-such.
But most persons never have such philosophic doubts; breakdowns of
prediction are explained as being due to ignorance of the causal
conditions which would invariably produce such-and-such. For ex-
ample, the airline pilot making a landing upon an invisible run-
way trusts his instruments; the scientist continues to putter
about in his laboratory in spite of the philosopher's misgivings.
This thesis attempts to justify our expectations of the fu-
ture by postulating a kind of necessity which is perceived as are
colors and shapes, rather than invented as is a symphony.
THF FIRST SECTION: ON NFCESSITY
Before we can speak accurately about the world, it might not
be amiss to find out what the world is.
Common sense makes a distinction (albeit a sloppy one) be-
tween things which "really exist" and things which are inventions.
We hear that tables and chairs are real while giants and Greek
gods are not. But there is a borderline area where this distinc-
tion becomes most fuzzy. Ancient wars were fought over ancient
gods, but no modern wars are fought over ancient gods; we prefer
our own.
There is a common idea that we should assume a belief to be
true lontil evidence forces us to call it false. This idea, how-
ever, sanctions one to fill his head with all sorts of nonsense,
such as gods, demons, freewill, holy water, the ether, man's basic
goodness/badness, leprechauns, centaurs, the inability of fish to
feel pain although they feel the hook, the righteousness of our
nation, and so on. Then what is real is sometimes a disputed
matter.
Many nersons will agree that if anything is real then tables
and chairs are real. But what would be said about the reality of
a poem? How much is "really there" and hov/ much do we read into
the poem? How real is the electron (we all believe that it is
more than a name for data)? How real is an idea? How real is a
painting?
These questions and comments should shov/ that there is by
no means a sharp demarcation between the things which are real
and the things which are not. Philosophers have sought for sortie
device which would indicate whether a thing is real, but all such
attempts have been failures because the common application of the
label "real" is haphazard,
Ludwig Wittgenstein has an interesting idea in the early por-
tions of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus : "Die Welt ist alles,
was ist der Pall" (the world is everything which is the case).
This is a cryptic utterance, but its essential meaning is that the
world is the sura total of what is true. However, to thus sharpen
the idea of reality, we must sharpen the idea of truth; but to
decide what is true apparently is not easier than to decide what
is real.
Usually a distinction is made between a theory and an object,
30 that the object (a table, say) is real but a theory is not.
There is some justification for this distinction, since a theory
can be ignored and it disap-nears; but wa will stumble over a table
if we try to ignore it, and if we throw it upon a junk-heap it is
still there.
It is by reason of this distinction that we say there is no
theory concerned in the nature of the table, A cat walking around
the table does not theorize upon its reality, and neither do we.
However, a bird will sometimes attack its reflection in a glass,
while usually we do not. Why is this? Perhaps we are theorizing,
and so know that the image in the mirror is not real (the phys-
icist calls it a "virtual" image).
It would be useful to show that there are some assumptions
we make about the nature of things which are called "real"; even
for the most clearly real objects such as tables and chairs
there are assumptions.
Theory in Object-Construction
Let one imagine himself to be on a plain, walking toward a
distant, indistinct object. As one approaches it, perhaps it is
seen to be a building of a certain color and size. Closer ap-
proach may reveal that the color of the building is not uniform,
but that its walls are made of vari-colored bricks; and progres-
sively closer approaches may reveal pits in the bricks, pits in
the pits, molecules, atoms, neutrinos, quanta, and other constit-
uents of the building.
It is said that all of these apoearances are of one object,
the building. But certainly there is an enormous difference be-
tween the appearance of the building from a distance of ten miles
and its appearance from a distance of one foot. However, the ap-
pearance of the building from a distance of ten miles does not
seem very different from its appearance at a distance of ten miles
and one foot. Then if by a succession of small steps one slowly
approaches the building, its appearance changes h^ imperceptible
degrees. Thus partially because of the gradual change we speak
of all the appearances as belonging to one object. But to look
at only one brick, and to say "It is part of the building" is to
rely upon memory. For when looking at one brick we do not see
the entire building; indeed we never see the entire building.
6Then what is it to say that the building is one object which
is shown to us by all its many appearances? When we say that an
appearance now is very much like a previous appearance, is that
alone enough to allow us to say that there is one object common
to all the appearances? Usually not, for we require that the ap-
pearance shall be "in the same place," also that sensations of
touch shall be associable with the visual sensations, and so on.
Yet when enough of these sensations are collated, we say that
there is a building.
It was mentioned that memory has an important role in our
collecting the sensations into one object. But how can the con-
junction (by memory) of the appearances be more indicative of the
presence of soraething-other-than-the-appearances than the occur-
rence of only one appearance? Why should repetition of appear-
ances establish anything other than the separate appearances of
their combination? Perhaps it is an oversimplification to speak
of "separate" appearances, for sometimes "separate" appearances
merge imperceptibly, as when one approaches a building. But all
that has been said is that appearances sometimes merge imper-
ceptibly; nothing is said about anything beyond the appearances.
For another example, what is the difference between the ap-
pearance of a penny at a distance of two hundred centimeters and
its appearance at a distance of two hundred and one centimeters?
The answer would vary; some persons would see a difference and
some would not. But since one sees only one appearance at a tine,
then how can one compare two appearances? Obviously only by
comparing a present appearance with a memory of a past one.
When one sees an appearance, one sees only the appearance.
Then when one sees a building from various distances and direc-
tions, one sees only the various appearances. The name "build-
ing" should be restricted to those appearances; for to say that
there is in addition to the apnearances an object which we sense,
is to say that there is something insensible which we sense, and
this is self-contradictory.
The Shape of a Penny
Should one ask the question, "What is the shape of a penny?"
the answer would be to the effect that a penny is a disk: of such-
and-such proportions. Should one ask further for the real shape
of the penny, one will perhaps receive an uncomprehending stare.
When the respondent attaches a meaning to the second question,
the answer will likely be again that a disk is the real shape.
Should one reply, "Mo, no, you said that before; I want to know
the real shape," the respondent is thrown into confusion. And
when we state that the penny has no "real shape," the respondent
may say, "Ahl The penny in truth is_ without real shape, because
it sometimes looks elliptical, sometimes circular, and sometimes
rectangular ... besides, a disk is a three-dimensional object
and we can only see two dimensions of the penny."
This game exhibits some interesting features of our concep-
tions of shape. In the ordinary usage, the shape of the penny is
said to be a disk, and it seems to be pointless concept-
8destruction to say that the label is in error. Upon occasion,
one does ask for the real shape of something when there is con-
fusion, as when one asks for the real shape of a stick thrust at
an angle into water. However, when one asks for the real shape
of a penny, one is asking for a concept which is not in the think-
ing of the marketplace. Thus the uncomprehending stare. Then
what is the meaning of our question? Since the answer is to be
"The penny has no real shape," the question seems to be a rhetor-
ical way of saying that since the penny has many appearances,
there is no reason for preferring some appearances over others
as being definitive of the shape of the object.
But is the marketplace wrong when it says that the penny ia^
a disk? No, for it would not deny that the penny has many ap-
pearances in shape. Indeed, it is because of its special variety
of appearances that the penny is called a disk and not an el-
lipse, circle, or rectangle. Every shape-appearance of the penny
is designated by the word "disk," Further, in order to verify
that the penny is a disk, one does the following operation which
presents every possible kind of shape-appearance a disk may pre-
sent; one looks at the circular aspect of the penny, and then one
turns it so that its rectangular appearance is seen, and then one
has seen all of its possible (macroscopic) shape-appearances. It
is then called a disk.
"Disk" is then a class-name for certain kinds of appearances
and no others. Of course, for estimating quickly the shape of a
penny, some appearances are more useful than others; but this is
9not to say that the less-useful rectangular appearance is ex-
cluded from the designation of the name "disk" while a more-
useful elliptical appearance is included,
"Disk" is the name for a group of appearances. Now it might
be well to inquire whether the appearances could be grouped in
some other way.
Since the name includes all of the appearances, any other
grouping of the appearances would eliminate some of them. The
inquiry might be begun by assuming that the penny is a circle.
One might also assume that the penny is a rectangle or that it is
one of many ellipses. These are equally correct since the penny
is compounded from them. But when one is looking at the circular
aspect of the penny he cannot see the rectangular aspect, and
vice versa. And when one is looking at one of the elliptical
aspects he cannot see any other aspect. How then can it be said
that the penny has all of these aspects, since at any instant one
can verify only one aspect at a time? One uses memory, as in the
case of perceiving the building.
When one looks at the circular aspect of a penny, how does
one distinguish the penny from a circle? The distinction is ac-
complished by knowing that if the circle is in imagination ro-
tated a few degrees about a diameter, it will appear to be an
ellipse; while if the same operation is performed upon the penny,
its thickness v/ill cause its appearance to be somewhat different
from that of a two-dimensional ellipse. Furthermore, should the
rotation be through ninety degrees, the penny will appear to be
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a rectangle while the circle will appear to be a line. But how
can we know all of this when looking at the circular aspect of
the penny? And when we have turned the penny so that an ellip-
tical aspect is seen, how do we know that it can be turned so as
to appear to be a circle?
Pre-philosophically, we think that the appearances seen in
the past are somehow "really there" and that we may view them
again merely by looking at the penny from a suitable direction.
In much the same way as one may view an automobile engine by
raising the hood of the car. The common feeling is that these
appearances exist whether seen or not. This feeling masks an as-
sumption, for we do not perceive an unseen appearance; to say
that these unseen appearances exist is to speak of unseen things
as if they were seen.
Then the marketplace is engaging in a bit of metaphysical
theorizing when it says that the penny is a disk, for to say this
is to say that past appearances exist and may become visible by
turning the penny.
It would seem as if all physical objects are subject to the
same analysis. Tables, chairs, trees, autos ... anything which
presents more than one appearance is called one object' by the
employment of the same kind of metaphysical theorizing as that
which is employed so that we may call all of the appearances of
a penny appearances of one object.
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The Size of a ^enny
To ask for the size of a penny will bring the reply that a
penny is, say, about an inch in diameter and about an eighth of
an inch in thickness. But to ask for the real size of a penny
would bring the familiar mystified countenance. For since the
penny has many sizes (depending upon its distance from us), how
can we say that the penny is, say, an inch in diameter*^ A ruler
will easily solve this, but only if we assume that the ruler
changes in apparent size with changes in distance commensurate
with such changes in the penny. But there is another method of
size-measure, triangulation.
Let an object be imagined which has the oddity that its size
changes irregularly and unpredictably, and let this be called a
"Protean" object. Let the Protean object be compared with a
penny. One brings them both into his hand, measures them with a
ruler (the Protean object all the while deceiving us by remaining
quiescent), and, say, finds them to be the same size. Then from
a distance one can calculate the distance of the penny from him
by measuring the angular size of its appearance and vice versa,
but the same method is unreliable for the Protean object, for its
size is erratic.
Now hov/ does one know that the penny is not a Protean object?
We have certain tests for deciding ?/hether an object has a fixed
size: one tries to compress it, or one sees whether the changes
in its subtended angle due to the changes in its distance are
commensurate with the distance-changes in the angular sizes of
IS
other objects. But these angle-measuring tests are unreliable
if an object is silhouetted against the sky when there are no
objects near it for comparison. In such cases, one can compute
distance only by assuming that the object has constant size at
constant distance (i.e., that the object is not Protean). The
same assumption applies to the measurement of distances at sea
or across a desert: without triangulation (i.e., to calculate
distances by using the sizes of images), only the above assumption
allows distance to be computed; to employ triangulation is to
assume the truth and applicability of mathematics as well as the
reliability and accuracy of instruments.
There is therefore an assumption in saying that something
has a constant size, whether size is measured by comparison with
a ruler or by calculation using a transit: the assumption is that
the object is not Protean, And in order to show that a penny is
not Protean, we must assume either that the objects with which it
is compared are not Protean or that the methods of surveying are
reliable.
Thus far, it has been seen that there are assumptions in our
ordinary ideas of shape and size. Do these reflections cast any
light upon the nature of reality?
There is theory involved in our separation of real things
from non-real things, for a Protean penny would be said to be an
unreal penny. Theoretical prerequisites are essential to the
eligibility of a thing for the label "real,"
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Necessity in Constructs
At this point another kind of case wherein theory and ap-
pearances are mixed should be considered.
Consider a mathematical triangle, and let one ask for the
relation between the whole and its parts. This matter should re-
veal certain relations between theory and appearances which will
make easier the transition from the theory-appearance interrela-
tions in stationary things to the theory-appearance interrelations
in moving (or rather, "changing") things, and so to causality.
A triangle is composed of lines and relations between the
lines. Now to change the shape of the triangle is necessarily to
change the relations between the lines, and so to change the ap-
pearance of the collection of lines, for at least one line must
suffer a change in length. For the same reason, to shorten a
line is necessarily to reduce the opposite angle if we are still
to have a triangle, otherwise the figure would not be closed.
We do not ordinarily say that there are causal relations
between the parts of a triangle or between the complete triangle
and any of its parts. However, if one were to change the shape
of the triangle, it would perhaps not be wrong to speak of a
causal relation between the change in shape of the triangle and
the change in length of at least one side of the triangle.
Furthermore, it seems that there is some sort of necessity in
this particular "causal relation," or at least there is a feeling
that there is necessity. But one does not observe this necessity
when one observes that the triangle is changing shape. Then how
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to account for the feeling of necessity? A careful examination
of what one does observe may provide an answer.
How do we observe geometrical figures? When we imagine a
chiliagon, we do not form in our minds a clear picture of a plane
figure with one thousand sides. Then how do we distinguish our
mental image of a chiliagon from our mental image of a circle? We
do this by several methods, all of which depend upon the close
examination of a section of the chiliagon so that it is seen to be
composed of lines and angles; no magnification of the circle will
show such lines and angles.
What do we see when we examine a drawing of a chiliagon? We
see that the figure is composed of many lines, but we do not know
it to be chiliagon until we count the lines. In the same way, we
must count the sides of an "icosagon" in order to know it to be
such. And most persons must count the sides of an octagon in
order to distinguish it from a hexagon.
The purpose of this is to admit the possibility that we do
not see the triangle as a unit, but that our perception of it
might involve counting sides (i,e., using memory) as does our per-
ception of a chiliagon. The task is now more difficult to jus-
tify our feeling that there is necessity between a change in a
side and a change in the opposite angle, for such necessity de-
pends upon whether there is a triangle maintained during the
change. For we need memory to know the persistence of the tri-
angle during the change, and there is also the possibility that
memory enters into the perception of an unchanging triangle.
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One solution is that one kind of necessity is a property of
definitions, so that from its definition ("a thousand-sided reg-
ular polygon" ) a chiliagon analytically must have one thousand
sides. But perhaps there are other answers; perhaps other kinds
of necessity are to be discovered in nature rather than in de-
finitions. This thesis is that there are such discoverable
necessities.
What is the relation between the definitions and the appear-
ances? If someone were to draw suitable lines on a paper, it
would be said that these appearances are a triangle. And that
is their relation, at least in this case: we order the appear-
ances by means of the definitions.
But can the necessity in the definition be applied to the
relations between the appearances? This can be seen to be so if
one does the following experiment. Consider a triangular figure,
and shorten one of its sides. To do this, of course, is to
change the appearance of the triangle, for one of the sides of
the triangle is shorter.
Now is shortening the line-segment forming the side a nec-
essary consequent of shortening the side? Yes, for the line is
as long as the side. Then does shortening the line necessarily
change the appearance of it? Yes, for the same reason that a
change in the shape of a penny produces a change in its appear-
ances: the reason for the necessity is that the denotation of
the word "penny" analytically includes certain appearances and
excludes others, so that to change the shape of the penny is
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analytically to change some or all of the appearances of it.
After one side is shortened, the resultant figure will be a
triangle only if the opposite angle is reduced so that the fig-
ure is again closed. And there is necessity here.
Necessity in this case has come from definition. To see
whether necessity can be found between the appearances one must
ask about the relation between triangles and their definition.
If by "triangle" one means the perfect triangle of mathematics,
then there can be no such triangles which do not fit the defini-
tion; that is, there are no triangles which are not triangles.
But is not this mathematical triangle simply a creature of
the imagination*!* Perhaps; but possibly one might attempt to ap-
ply the mathematical triangle to the world, to see whether it
can be applied to the world, and if so to what extent.
Beyond the window is a large tract of land criss-crossed
with sidewalks. Three of the sidewalks form a triangle. But
they are not a triangle; they are three sidewalks. However,
their relation is the relation between the components of the
mathematical triangle congruent to the sidewalks.
But the mathematical triangle does not have footprints,
pebbles, contractor's marks, and so on; nor are the sidewalks
straight and plain. In other words, we are not interested in
every aspect of the individual sidewalks when we pronounce the
collection of the three sidewalks a triangle; we are interested
in length only, ^.nd length is more nearly an essential part of
the physical sidewalk than is the kind of cement or the pithy
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sayings inscribed while the cement was wet. Again, a bit of
theory is essential to the ordering of appearances, for how can
length be an appearance as is shape or color'^ A chessboard can
be seen to be colored, but can it be seen (in the same sense) to
have length?
The shape of a mathematical triangle cannot be changed with-
out changing the shape of at least one line. Therefore , since
length Is an essential part of a sidewalk, and since length is a
sufficient condition for a line, the sidewalk necessarily contains
a line. Therefore, there is a necessary connection between the
essential length of a sidewalk and the mathematical triangle
formed by the lengths of three such sidewalks each of which in-
tersects the other two. In the case of the mathematical triangle,
the thing is the denotation of its definition and vice versa.
Therefore, to find necessity in the internal relations of the
thing-by-definition (i.e. the mathematical triangle) is to find
necessity in the internal relations of the thing-referred-to
(i.e. the physical triangle).
If we invoke the argument above as to the necessity between
changing the length of one sidewalk (by shortening it) and chang-
ing the triangle formed by three such sidewalks (if we are still
to have a triangle) then the distinction indicated in the Intro-
duction between theory and the world is still more fuzzy, for we
have said that an analytic statement describes the world. Then
the analytic statement is not entirely vacuous. (This point will




The necessity so far has come from definitions, and so it is
analytic necessity. Someone might object that in saying that the
concept of the sidewalks contains a line. But does the referent
of the concept contain a line? For the referent of the term
"sidewalk" is a blob of cement, with cracks, footprints, pits,
irregularities, chipped places, etc. Surely it is very strange
to say that the thing we are now walking; upon contains a line;
and it is even stranger to say that the line is necessarily con-
tained. For what we are walking upon is only a mass of appear-
ances, and how can one appearance be deductively and thus neces-
sarily connected to another? Is it not going beyond the appear-
ances to say that there is such necessity'' We never see necessity
as we see a blob of cement, so isn*t necessity an invention from
the appearances? And are not inventions arbitrary, so that other
inventions from the blob of cement might not have the necessity?
Which in a roundabout way says that necessity comes from arbitrary
definition and invention rather than discovery? Therefore, de-
ductive necessity is not a property of the world, but is a feature
of certain of our arrangements of appearances, and the appearances
could as easily have been arranged in some other way so that
necessity was not applicable to the relations between appearances.
These are powerful objections to the attempt to insinuate
necessity into the world. The objector is saying, "You are not
being fair in twisting the world so that inventions are discovered
in it as are appearances. You are arguing by definition,"
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It in5.ght be replied that the v/orld includes all the real
things, and that certain assumptions are requisite for classify-
ing some things as real; for example, the size and shape of pen-
nies (but not of nebulae) mupt be constant before they are
eligible for the label "real."
It will be objected that even though such assumptions may
show that what is real depends upon what we say, still it has not
been shown that there is any non-invented necessity connecting
one appearance with another. The attempt v/ill now be made to show
that in the case of length-perception, there is_ such necessity
between appearances.
On Length
When Cro-Magnon heaves his spear at a running deer, or when
the fibbon brachiates from limb to limb, or when the quick brown
fox jumps over the lazy dog, or when the infant reaches for the
moon, or when the surveyor peers through his transit, or when the
physicist sends light back and forth along a mile-long vacuum
tube: these all involve mensuration of distance.
Fxcept for the degree of accuracy, the Tneasurement of dis-
tance by the counting of wave-lengths of light is not different
from the Greek armies* way of measuring distance by counting
stages. Further, the lion before leaping at a gazelle measures
distance in much the same way as does Cro-Magnon before throwing
his spear. For these reasons, a distance seen by the lion is very
much like a distance seen by Cro-Magnon, and by the gibbon, and by
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the Hellenic heavy-armed troops, and by Michelson the physicist.
Imagine a geometry student looking at a piece of paper on
which two crosses are drawn. What is the distance between the
two? If the distance is small, both can be seen at the same time
clearly; but if the distance is somewhat larger, the eyeball must
move from one to the other (unless the observer moves further
away from the paper).
At this point a terra should be introduced. "Perceptual unit"
will designate such things as small patches of red, small dis-
tances (as between the holes in the top of a saltshaker ) , and
small numbers of objects so that their number may be known at a
glance without counting. Then a small circle is a perceptual
unit but a small chiliagon is not, for we must count its sides in
order to know it to be a chiliagon; however, before such counting,
both of the figures display the perceptual unit "circularity," and
so in that sense both are perceptual units. But two crosses
separated by a distance of two miles are not a perceptual unit,
for one must remember one of them as he trudges toward the other.
What happens as the two crosses are slowly brought together
after their two-mile separation? The pertinent observation is
that the above need for memory gradually becomes less as the dis-
tance decreases, until finally the two crosses obviate the need
for memory as they become a perceptual unit. What is the amount
of the separation at which this occurs? The amount varies from
person to person with the variance of peripheral vision; neither
is it constant for one observer due to the variance of peripheral
21
vision with fatigue, glaucoma, and so on. Then the size of the
perceptual unit is not independent of the observer.
After the distance has decreased to less than the extension
of the perceptual unit, then the perception of its continued
shrinking is also a perceptual unit. Then it seems that one
might speak of various qualities of these perceptual units (taken
singly or in combination), each quality itself being a perceptual
unit. Two units may intersect, be parallel, rotate, vibrate;
three units may be a triangle, and so on. Then some relations can
be perceptual units.
The perception of large distances will be accomplished by a
process employing something like the following model: Imagine a
rolled scroll, with a cross at each end of the text and with a
line joining the two crosses. As the scroll is turned as if to
read the text, one cross appears, then disappears, and we follow
the line to the other cross. Or perhaps we are on the desert, and
come to a railway. Our head turns as we look from one horizon to
the other in order to see whether the railway is straight. In
each of the two cases, the method is roughly the same: we can
estimate a large distance by estimating the number of perceptual
units between the two ends of the distance.
But since the perceptual units vary in size with the observer
and so are of indefinite size, and since they may be seen to over-
lap, then the perceptual units are units of one thing, which is
called "distance." An example will expand the meaning.
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The rioor where this is written is laid over with tiles.
The perceptual unit centered around a point on the floor about
six feet away has a lateral dimension including about seven of
these tiles. By shifting the eyes slightly to the right, a new
tile appears at the right edge of the perceptual unit and the
leftmost tile disappears. In this way one can sweep visually the
floor; any one tile appears at one edge of the field of vision,
moves across the field, then disappears at the other edge. Now
the tiles are rather large, but each of them bears a deEsign which,
taken with those of the other tiles, forms a pattern of units
smaller than that of the complete tiles. Then when "about seven"
of the tiles are in a perceptual unit, one is not sure whether one
of the small patterns at the edge of the "seven tiles'" is or is
not included in the large perceptual unit. That is, the boundaries
of the perceptual units are indistinct.
The purpose is to find some necessity linking the adjacent
perceptual units.
If one looks at two adjacent perceptual units of tile (but
of course not at the same instant), then by shifting the eyss one
can see another perceptual unit of tile centered on the boundary
betv/een the two first-mentioned units. Then since the same point
may now be in one perceptual unit and later in another unit, the
units are necessarily connected by their containment of a common
point.
Two objections can be made here. The first is that knowledge
of any connection between the two units depends upon comparing a
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present unit with a memory of a past unit, and so since memory is
unreliable we cannot argue for necessity (or for any other rela-
tion between the units). The second objection is that even if
memory were reliable, that necessity is not something; observed,
but is something inferred: the possession of a point in common
does not show anything else, especially not that such commonness
is necessary or that the entities having the common point are
necessarily connected. These objections are serious.
As a large distance has been broken into perceptual units,
let a perceptual unit now be broken into subdivisions, and let
the subdivisions overlap. Here one can "see" the necessary con-
nection (the second objection attacks this "seeing") between sub-
units without resorting to memory. Then by analogy, the same
interrelations (possession of common points is the most important
interrelation here ) would hold between perceptual units as between
the subdivisions of perceptual units. And thus the necessity is
"seen." A reply to the second objection will now be made.
Using language, to say "A is A" is to express a tautology,
which is said to be necessarily true. Therefore, to say "A is
A" is not only to say that A is A, but also that necessarily A is
A. Then to make a true statement about concentric circles A and B
(for example, "Circle A is in circle B" ) is to say not only that
A is in B, but also that necessarily A is in B. If it is not
vacuous to say that "A is A" is not only true but also necessarily
true, then it is not vacuous to say that not only is circle A in
circle B but also that A necessarily is in B. If the addition is
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vacuous that whatever is true is necessarily true, then the neces-
sary truth of the tautology becomes meaningless • Let it not be
immediately objected that the tautology and the circle have dif-
ferent modes of truth, for in the section dealing with "topograph-
ical models" the "tv/o modes" of truth are considered in an attempt
to fuse them.
Necessity by Perception
How can any necessity be a thing known by perception? This
quasi-rehtorical question is raised by the second objection, A
red patch can be perceived, and so can a length, but can necessity
be perceived? The following case may show how this is possible,
and it should also show that "perception of necessity" is no more
a bizarre usage of "to perceive" than is the accepted usage
"perception of length."
Consider three small concentric circles labeled A, B, and C
in order of increasing radius. If the circles are suitably small
we can see by a perceptual-unit-of-relation that A is included in
B, that B is included in C, and that A is included in C. We see
(in a purely optical sense) further that A must be in B, for that
is what the perception indicates. The perception (optical)
"excludes" (topographically) the possibility (linguistic only)
that A is not in B, (The meanings here v/ill be explored later at
various points )
•
Now to deny (only verbally, of course) the necessity is to
allow (also only verbally) the possibility that A is at present
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not included in B. Such possibility is incompatible with the per-
ception that A is_ at present in B, which means that necessity
cannot in any way be denied to A*s being in B, But this does not
establish "perceptive necessity," and if we say that A is neces-
sarily in B we are saying that what is so is necessarily so. This
certainly makes the concept of necessity (fuzzy as it may be)
rather vacuous - - - yet we do not consider it vacuous to say that
"A is A" is not merely true, but necessarily true. But could the
vacuity be avoided by saying that some things are necessarily so
and others not? Then if so, what would be the criteria by which
necessity is imputed to some and denied to others? One such
criterion is currently in use, and it is that necessity is a
property solely of certain deductive arguments which somehow "feel
right." This property of right-feeling deductive arguments I shall
call "deductive necessity."
Now there are two methods by which we can know that circle A
is necessarily included in circle C. One of them is the same as
that outlined above for seeing the necessity that A is in B; one
simply looks, and sees that A is in C . The other method is that
characterized by "deductive necessity." I shall now try to show
that deductive necessity reduces to perceptive necessity; or
rather that deductive necessity can be known only by perceptive
necessity.
In one way, the reduction is obvious: the Venn diagrams,
the Euler circles, and other pictorial devices for testing syl-
logistic validity convert deductive necessity into perceptive
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necessity. (The devices are not merely "illustrative analogies,"
for all the "analogues" are examples of perceptive necessity.
)
Such are not the only methods for testing validity, for there is
the scheme of distribution analysis. Furthermore, there are some
syllogisms which are so obviously valid or invalid that one can
know at a glance their logical form and so their validity.
The last two sentences in the above paragraph are the key to
the reduction of deductive necessity into perceptive necessity.
For with sufficient intelligence, these diagrams and distribution-
schema would not be needed; any syllogism could immediately be
grasped and pronounced valid or invalid. The diagrams etc. serve
merely to analyze large intuitive leaps into smaller ones which
can be understood at a glance. And then given proven relations
between the small leaps, we can pronounce judgment upon the larger
ore of which the smaller ones are parts. That this analyzation
of the leap is_ the function of the diagrams can be seen if one
tries to explain even a simple syllogism to a dunce or to a child:
one eventually reaches a point in the explanation whereat no
further reductions are possible if the size of the requisite
logical leaps, and then one must say, "But don't you SEF?" It
requires a certain amount of intelligence to understand even the
classic Socrates-man-mortal syllogism.
In the light of the preceding comments, consider the
"Socrates" syllogism, which shall be a case of deductive necessity.
Perhaps the clearest method to show the validity of the syllogism
would be to employ the Venn diagram; the circles will show perhaps
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more easily than language that if Focr£.tes is a man and all men
are mortal then Socrates is mortal. The Venn diagram is under-
stood to show necessity by means of perceptive necessity, but how
do we understand the necessity that the conclusion follows when
the syllogism is expressed by an English sentence" By the same
process? Granted that perceptive necessity is known by inspec-
tion of the world, so that ?/e can see that one circle is included
in another, and granted also that the Venn diagrams show some
cases of deductive necessity to be knowable by transposition to
the perceptive necessity of the Venn diagram, does it follow that
all cases of deductive necessity can be known, or especially can
be known only , by transposition to perceptive necessity?
What is the difference between deductive necessity and per-
ceptive necessity? Perhaps an extensive definition will suffice
to illustrate the difference. Perceptive necessity is exempli-
fied by the observation that if one circle is included in another,
it is necessarily so included. Deductive necessity is exemplified
by such things as using formulas to find the speed of falling
bodies; mathematical operations produce the necessity. To sum-
marize the difference, perceptive necessity can be knov/n directly
from observing the relations between perceptual units, but deduc-
tive necessities deal with abstracted entities such as number,
mortality, manhood, and being called Socrates; and so they are
known by axioms, rules, definitions, etc.
The essential query is: must the deductive necessities b©
assimilated to some sort of topographical model in order to be
understood?
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The Role of Topographical Models in the
Comprehension of Necessity
One might note the extent to which topographical models enter
metaphorically into our discussions of abstract entities: we
speak of "fields" or research, "areas" of specialization, "circu-
lar" reasoning, a romantic "triangle," "linear" equations,
"spheres" of influence, a "square peg in a round hole," "opposite
sides" of a question, a "circle" of friends, a "line" of succes-
sion, "circumlocution" in debate, and so on. One might also note
that the abstractions so connected are taught to us by means of
the concrete things from which the abstractions are withdrawn.
Thus a child learns to count by usin*^ apples or matches, and the
most sophisticated philosophers call for cases and examples of
the matters they discuss.
But v;hat of the following case of deductive necessity: "all
bachelors are unmarrier!?" f^ust this be assimilated to a topo-
graphical model in order to be understood?
What sort of mental operation is performed when one perceives
that "unmarried adult male" includes "unmarried?" Does one not
"see" that the first member of the three-term series is the same
as the single term "unmarried?" One does not merely repeat the
term "unmarried"; one sees that it occurs once in the three-terra
series and once in the one-term series (i.e. the single terra).
This is of course a repetition, but it is more than a mere repe-
tition; for one sees that the contexts of the two occurrences are
not the same: the analyticity of "bachelors are unmarried" is
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iinderstood only by imagining the three-term series "tinraarried
adult male" to be seen in one place while the one-term series
"unmarried" is seen in another place and in a different context,
even if the place is nothing more than the positions of the terms
in a formula "unmarried adult male - unmarried," The feeling is
of turning the head to look in a different place.
This is no proof that deductive necessities mus t be assimi-
lated to topographical models in order to be understood, but it
seems that many persons understand language in this topographical
way. And since all the conventional definitions of logical,
analytic, deductive, and apodictic necessity are in essence ex-
emplified by the deducibility of "unmarried" from "bachelor,"
therefore all necessities are at least capable of being understood
in a topographical way. Then there must be something about topo-
graphical models from which one can obtain the concept of neces-
sity. That "something" is denoted by the term "perceptive neces-
sity." But the writer does not have any sharper or clearer idea
of what that something is, but does anyone know what justice is?
Fortunately, it does not seem expedient to investigate further the
idea of perceptive necessity, nor of necessity in general.
It will be objected that "perceptive necessity" is grossly
analytic. For of course circle A is seen to be in circle B, but
does that establish that it is necessarily in circle B? Does this
mean anything more than the tautology that if something exists
then it exists? The answer to the last question is in the affirm-
ative (cf. p. 24 on tautologies). However, a few additional com-
ments will not be amiss.
"Logical necessity" usually means that if something is true
then its contradictory is self-contradictory; therefore the orig-
inal is true. Vs/hat does this mean, and how does one know what
it means? For a case in point, consider the contradiction
"married bachelor." Excluding humorous allusions such as "Sam
really gets around; he*s a married bachelor," one sees that the
self-contradiction involved is due to the self-contradiction
"married unmarried adult male." But how do we know this latter to
be self-contradictory? This seems a puerile question, for the
answer can be a condescending "Vve know it to be a self-contradic-
tion from the definition of v/hat it is to be a contradiction,"
This verbal answer is admirable for its lofty aims but lamentable
for its failure, for if it is in Sanskrit I will not understand
it, and indeed many persons will not understand it in English
(especially those v/ho do not sneak English). The point is, how
does one understand English"^ By being given ostensive defini-
tions until one knows the referents of enough words to be able to
understand elementary abstractions, and then more abstruse ab-
stractions to the limit of one's intelligence. But all of these
abstractions are understandable only from their common rott, ex-
perience. Then language is understood only from experience, one
class of which is visual experience.
Therefore again it is suggested that a topographical model
is indispensable: one considers "married" and then "unmarried,"
and sees that they are incompatible. But how does one know their
incompatibility? If they are incompatible then how can they be
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compared so as to discover such Incompatibility? One way would
be to take the married things and then the un:narried things and
to see that in no case does the same thing have both qualities;
another way would be to say that by definition no thing can have
both qualities. But in both ways the analysis is incomprehensible
unless one examines (eventually) a real group of individuals with
one quality and then a separate group with the other quality; and
since it is easily "seen" that the two groups are in different
places, their incompatibility is known topographically. However,
the two groups of people might be mixed, with the marrieds wear-
ing, say, blue hats and the unmarrieds v/earing red hats. Then
since no blue-hat wearer is also a red-hat wearer, the incompat-
ibility is still known topographically.
Thus self-contradiction in this case is known topograph-
ically, and since self-contradiction is essential to logical
necessity, then logical necessity is known topographically.
Therefore reductio ad absurdum proofs (wherein a contradictory is
shown to be self-contradictory, thus proving an original) are
knowable by their reducibility to the perceptive necessity found
in topographical models. And if deductive necessity is knowable
(and testable) by its reducibility to perceptive necessity, then
what is deductive necessity but a kind of perceptive necessity
dealing with entities which are called "abstract" (even though
they must be made less abstract in order to be understood)?
Now the discussion is ready to return to a previous idea
(p,23): that in perceiving lengths there is a necessary connection
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between the perceptual units into which a large length is divis-
ible. The "second objection" to the idea was that necessity is
not observed but inferred. It has been met by reducing logical
inference to perception and by the note on the necessity of
tautological truths. The first objection may now be considered:
it was objected that knowledge of necessity between perceptual
units depends upon comparing a present unit with a memory of a
past one, and that since memory is unreliable we cannot know the
necessity.
The objection has its force from the fact that memory is
often mistaken in what it presents to us; we very often make such
mistakes in trivial matters. But in matters which we wish to re-
member, we can remember correctly and know that we remember cor-
rectly, Vii'hat the objection means is that the remembering of a
past perceptual unit is subject to the same sort of unreliability
as is attributed to memory in the following case: "I thought I
had left my fountain pen right here, but apparently I am mistaken
in thinking so, for it isn*t here and no one could have moved it."
The time between perceptual units is too short for fading
to cause unreliability as does fading cause unreliability of our
very earliest memories. But a test should show that in the per-
ception of length, recent memories are reliable: given an appear-
ance of a thing, one can turn away, remembering, and note the
fading of the memory. But at any time during the fading, one
can again turn to the appearance of the thing, and compare the
appearance of the thing with the memory (assuming the thing is
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unchanged -- photographs will establish this), to see whether
the memory has become drastically altered. It will be fomid that
in some respects the memory is changed and in others it is not.
(There is a problem with the identity of the memory during its
fading, but this problem in general is handled later in the sec-
tion "On Changes."
)
If it is found that the memory is accurate, then one is com-
paring a present perceptual with a memory of a past one; and by
applying the given test one can be sure that the memory is suf-
ficiently a reliable copy of a past appearance. A final point in
favor is that retinal persistence indicates that the "fading" is
not entirely a fading of memory, but in a way is also a fading of
an appearance. (The process-product ambiguity of the term
"appearance" so far in the discussion has been noticeable but
not serious,
)
Necessity in the Motion of a Tricycle
It was said in discussing the case of the triangle formed by
three sidewalks that if one sidewalk is shortened the opposite
angle must be decreased if we are still to have a triangle. Here
is a case wherein for a definition to continue to refer to the
world something in the world must change. The question is how
we relate the meaning of the definition of a triangle to the
world. The answer is that topographical models are used in the
process of comprehending the (verbal) definition of the word
"triangle," and that the necessity in the topographical model is
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transposable to the sidev/alk-triangle corresponding to the topo-
graphical model.
Suppose a child is driving a tricycle along the sidewalk-
triangle. Suppose further that the child repeats the circuit of
the three sidewalks, leaving after a few circuits have been com-
pleted. If the child has not stopped from the time he entered
the sidewalks until the time he left them, shall we say, "It
was all one motion?" This is acceptable, for the child never
stopped his motion, and what does it matter how many times he
changed direction? To be "more accurate," it might be said that
whenever the child was moving along this sidewalk it was one mo-
tion, and whenever he was moving along that sidewalk it was
another motion. After this consideration perhaps the child has
not one motion, but three (one for each sidewalk). To be still
"more accurate" it might be said that each change of direction
would be a new motion, so that ten circuits of the sidewalks
would be described as thirty motions. But the tricycle changes
direction not only when the child steers from one sidewalk to
another, but also every time the handlebars move. And if there
is play in the steering mechanism there is another source of
changes in direction. Obviously there are now many motions for
every yard of distance; if a wheel strikes an ant there will be
a change of direction. Further, changes in speed may be taken
as changes in motion. Then the situation soon becomes extrav-
agantly complicated, for the child does not apply power evenly
throughout a revolution of the drivewheel. The gravitational
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attraction of a stone alongpide the sidewalk will affect the
velocity; so does the wind from passing flying insects.
Is the tricycle's motion one motion, or three or some colos-
sal number? All of these are correct: one's interest of the
moment governs which aspect of the motion is emphasized.
What happens if one of the sidewalks is shortened? The
motion-as-one is not affected, but the motion-as-three is af-
fected in that one of them is along a shorter path. The other
aspects of the motion suffer variously; however, the aspect
vvherein one considers that an onlooking ant exerts a gravitational
influence is probably not involved, for the ant's mass multiplied
by the tricycle's mass is a rather small number.
The point is that motion in at least one of its myriad
senses (i.e. distance covered) will be affected by changes in the
sidewalk triangle. Is there any necessity for this? Yes, the
necessity between motion and one of its components is a feature
of the definition of motion in terms of distance, velocity, time,
and so on.
Necessity has been transposed from a mathematical triangle
to a sidewalk-triangle, and then to the motion of a tricycle
along the sidewalks. And since one motion is like another in
that all motions are processes of change in the space-relations
between objects, then what can be said of the tricycle's motion
can be said of similar motions of any object.
It will be objected that the necessity of the change in the
motion should one side of the triangle be shortened is analytic.
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But one need not express the necessity of this fact in language
in order to be aware of it; we can know by some non-linguistic
process (the existence, operation, and results of which are com-
municated to others by language) that a shorter distance means a
shorter duration of motion (at constant velocity, of course). It
may well be that all facts are linguistic in that they are ex-
pressible, but this does not exclude from the class of facts non-
linguistic elements such as color and pain.
But are not analyticity and necessity usually considered to
be features of language only? It has been argued that perceptive
necessity is not invented by language, but is discovered in na-
ture by perception and described by language. Of course, lin-
guistic entities (such as 'bachelors*) are both invented and de-
scribed by language (we do not perceive bachelorhood), but this
is not so in the case of motion: one perceives motion, and also
perceives (but not in the same way, although still non-
linguistically) that a shortened path means a shorter duration
of motion. (Perception of necessities in linguistic entities re-
quires topographical models and so becomes perceptive necessity.
)
It could be objected that the shortened duration along a
shortened path is empirical knowledge gained after familiarity
with such events, and so there is no more perceptive necessity
here than in the prediction that the sun will rise tomorrow.
It is true that one cannot know any perceptive necessity of
unperceived things, just as one cannot know the color of an un-
perceived thing. It is also true that one cannot know the
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perceptive necessity of shortened-duration-along-shortened-path
until one has observed that activity in nature. But these two
truths are irrelevant, for perceptive necessity deals with en-
tities either presently being observed or observed in the past.
THE SECOND SECTION: CAUSALITY WITH NECESSITY
Lengths are divisible into perceptual units of indefinite
size, which are necessarily connected linearly and serially by
the perception of greatly-extended objects. Also, there is
necessity in a few kinds of changes, so that if a side of a tri-
angle is shortened, then to remain in a triangle the opposite
angle must also change.
It may now be asked whether causal changes have such ne-
cessity. ViOiat is causality?
Cases of Causality
It is difficult to give an adequate analytical definition
of causality, for the concept is diffuse. And so a list of ex-
amples of causality follows, with a general discussion of the
concept afterwards,
(A) The suspension cable causes the bridge platform to
remain in place,
(B) If I throw a baseball to first base, the acceleration
of gravity will cause its path to be a parabola,
(C) The Great Wall of China helped cause the downfall of
the Roman Empire.
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(D) Time causes a woman's skin to become coarse.
{V) The rusting of iron is caused by its oxidation,
(P) High temperature causes iron to glow,
(G) Being a bachelor causes one to be unmarried,
(H) The sun will rise tomorrow because it has risen every
day in the past,
(I) Decapitation caused the death of Charles I,
(J) An unfavorable conjunction of Mars and Venus caused
your business to collapse,
(K) The Civil War was caused by Yankee meddling in Southern
affairs
.
(L) Chance causes a coin toss to have an unpredictable out-
come.
(M) "A quarter of a million persons died because of that
monkey's bite." -Churchill, referring to the death by blood-
poisoning of King Alexander of Greece in 1920,
(N) For want of a nail, a horse was lost; for want of a
horse, a message was lost; for want of a message, a battle was
lost; for want of a victory, a kingdom was lost. All lost for
want of a horseshoe nail.
Need There be a Cause for Fvery Change?
All but two of the given examples of causality deal with some
sort of change; the exceptions are cases (A) and (B), It should
be noted that case (a) is a causal statement by reason of its
exclusion of causes which would otherwise result in change;
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to say -'the commander singlehandedly held his company together"
is to say that the commander disposed of all disturbing influ-
ences, and to say that the cable holds the bridge platform is to
say that the cable prevents gravity from plummeting the bridge
into the abyss.
These cases indicate that the changeless persistence of
something is due to the absence of disturbing factors, which is
of course rankly analytic. It is_ anal;ytic to say that a thing
will remain changeless unless it changes, but is it legitimate
to assume therefore that a steady state v/ill continue as such?
If it changes, then obviously a causal factor has operated to
produce the change; and if it does not change, then no causal
factor has operated to change it. Vl/hat are the reasons for the
preceding sentence? The last clause is clearly analytic, but the
first clause comes from our habitual tendency to think that there
is some cause for every change.
Can we assume a cause for the absence of change, except in
the sense that something might prevent change by overpowering
any impinging causal influence? Many things contribute to lack
of change (e.g. the great mass of a ship prevents its motion when
a child tugs at the hawser holding it to a pier), but can any of
these be said to be a cause for lack of change?
"Causes" usually deal v/ith change, and a steady state is the
result either of some sort of balance between conflicting causal
agents or of the "shielding" of the steady state from causal
agents which without the shielding v/ould produce a change.
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Newton's first law of motion illustrates the meaning: can we
speak of a cause for a body's remaining at rest or in steady-state
motion? Such causes will be data for "the inertia theory of
change" (analogous to the inertia theory of steady-state motion).
We say that things remain as they are unless something
changes them (it is not easy to say whether this sentence is
analytic). But why jump to this conclusion? Why say that there
are no spontaneous changes'^
It was a shock to the "inertia theory of change" when statis-
tical mechanics came into vogue. For in such a system, it can be
predicted that a certain percentage of a mass of atoms v/ill decay
in one second, but it cannot be predicted when one selected atom
will decay. It might be said that the "cannot" is due to empir-
ical ignorance and not to theoretical edict, but the idea of
spontaneous change has been mentioned.
Upon what grounds do we exclude spontaneous changes? Most
changes can be attributed to "causes," and many changes once puz-
zling have been shown to have a causal source. For these reasons
it is suspected that causes will be discovered for the decay of
each Individual atom. However, so far no such causes have been
found.
To speak of a cause for a steady state is usually to speak
of equilibrium between opposing agents. But would we say that
there is a cause for the persistence of an utterly isolated and
changeless entity (say, God)? Probably not; we are likely in such
a case to say merely that the entity is beyong causation, etc.
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It might be said that case (S), "being a bachelor causes one to
be unmarried," is neither a case of causality nor does it deal
with a change.
Is the case a case of causality? If so, it is such in a
somewhat extended sense, as the sense in which the premises of a
syllogism cause the conclusion. But for those who v/ould say that
it is not a case of causality, I would refer them to the above
cause of the truth of a syllogistic conclusion. This is a case of
what might be called "deductive causality."
The remainder of the cases given are examples of "physical
causality." It will be noted that each of them attempts to ex-
plain a change by postulating the influence of something else.
It will also be noted that the "something else" varies from case
to case: in case (B) a physical force is invoked; case (J) is an
unsatisfactory explanation of business failure. Cases (M) and (N)
seem partially acceptable and partially inadequate, for if Alex-
ander had been an ordinary man the monkey would have caused per-
haps only one death; the battle was lost for many reasons, only
one of which was the failure of communications.
Deductive causality and perceptive necessity seem to be very
much the same sort of thing, since deduction in general is known
and tested by topographical models which exhibit the deductive
necessity by reducing it to perceptive necessity.
What of physical causality*^ There might be cases of it which
are known by perceptive necessity (e.g, opening a door), but there
will be many cases of it wherein there is no such perceptive
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necessity (i.e. the sun will rise tomorrow). However, in some of
these latter cases theory attempts to link cause with effect.
Now, it will be remembered that theory (such as the assumptions
in the shape of a penny, and especially those in the perception of
motion and length) is sometirr.es essential to our judging something
to be "real," The task is to search for some such essential
assumptions in physical causality, with the aim of finding some
sort of necessity in physical causality.
Against the Idea that There is Some Bimple First Cause
Ultimately Responsible for Fvery Change
An argument for spontaneous changes will now be presented in
order to attack the idea that every change has a cause. This idea
appears also in the concept of the first cause: the first cause
is a cause, itself uncaused, in relation to which every other
cause is an effect.
Consider the toss of a die. We say that the result is
governed by chance, but we do not say that the outcome is uncaused,
By "chance" we mean that one face of the die has been uppermost
after a dietoss as often in the past as has any other; and by
"cause" we mean that one event leads predictably to another, so
that from the dietoss we should be able to predict which face
will be uppermost. Now can these two ideas be reconciled?
It is clear from the above what is meant by chance. But it
is not at all clear what is meant by cause, for chance is con-
cerned merely with the frequency of occurrence of a phenomenon,
while cause seeks for explanations for the occurrence of the
phenomenon.
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Precisely what do we mean when we say that the outcome of a
dietoss is not uncaused? When we say that the falling of a stone
is not uncaused, we mean that it has in some way become unsup-
ported and that therefore gravity can pull it down. And when we
say that the outcome of a dietoss is not uncaused, we have in mind
some sort of similar explanation for the outcome.
In some chance-governed phenomena, no explanations are ad-
vanced. For example, in radio-active decay one knows that a cer-
tain percentage of the atoms will decay per second, but one does
not know when one selected atom will decay. There is also the
opposing view that the greater knovrledge will give us the power
of prediction in this case; the view seems to spring from the
idea that all secret causes will eventually be known, including
those v/hich produce the decay of atoms. This latter view assumes
that every change has a cause, or that no change can be spontan-
eous. The following argument will attack this view.
In saying that a dietoss has a caused outcome, we think that
knowledge of ballistics and initial conditions of the falling die
will alone enable us to predict the outcome: given the falling
we can predict the outcome; given the throwing we can predict the
falling, the bouncing, and the outcome; given the state of the
muscles and nerves, we can predict the throv/ing and so the fall-
ing, the bouncing, and the outcome; and so on, Fvery change now
has some cause which is in turn a change and so has a cause.
This analysis continues until some beginning is reached for the
chain of causes; this beginning is the first cause. An analogy
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to this chain would be the game wherein a child sets up a row of
dominoes and then tips the first into the second, which strikes
the third, which strikes the fourth, and so on until the last
domino falls*
Suppose that the outcome of the dietoss is a five. Then the
bouncing which produced this five is not a duplicate of the bounc-
ing which produces, say, a six, for one of the principles of
causality is that duplicate causes cause duplicate effects. And
one might say (for the same reason) that the falling which pro-
duces the five*s bouncing is not a duplicate of the falling which
produces, say, a six's bouncing; neither are the two throwings
duplicates; nor the two states of the muscles and nerves; and so
on. Then no nart of the causal chain leading to the five is a
duplicate of any part of the chain leading to the six, or else the
subsequent parts of the two chains would be duplicates with a
duplicate result. It also follows that the beginnings of the two
chains cannot be duplicates (or else the entire chains are dupli-
cates with duplicate results ) . Therefore there can be no simple
entity to cause first a five-chain and then a six-chain; nor can
there be a simple entity to cause either chain not to occur.
This means that there is nothing simple which could direct which
chain of the two shall be initiated, nor could a complex entity
(i.e, one containing a conjunction of beginnings of the chains)
direct the initiation, for in that respect it would be simple when
it initiates a chain rather than complex; any complexity would
enter when the entity is "considering" which chain to initiate.
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This means that such initiation is spontaneous v/hether or not such
initiation is due to "consideration'' of which chain shall be in-
itiated. The first cause, if complex, is not a cause but contains
causes; as such it is analogous to an egg.
It might be said that spontaneity means self-generation,
which is absurd: how can something which does not exist generate
anything, especially itself? However, the simple first cause is
subject to the same accusation as is the complex first cause:
either it is not a first cause, or it has generated itself (ab-
surd), or it has existed from eternity; none of which is a satis-
factory answer to the problem of origins faced by both the simple-
first-cause school and the complex-first-cause school.
Then it seems that the five-chain and the six-chain are
mutually independent. It might be wondered how many of such inde-
pendent causal chains there are.
Our Interests, and Not Some Power in the Cause, Govern
Our Fstablishment of Any Causal Sequence
A "five" has been mentioned as being the result of one of
many causal chains. But "a five" is the name for many things, be-
cause the die may assume countless positions around a vertical
axis, and any of these would be called a five if the five-face of
the die were uppermost. Furthermore, the die may come to rest on
the table, on the floor, here, there, anywhere, and as long as the
five-face is uppermost the result is "a five." Thus there are very
many results, and by the preceding argument each result is the end
of an independent causal chain.
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Prom this it is noticed that a detailed picture of causal
sequences would be rather complicated. And so a simpler case will
be selected for further analysis.
The line of toppling dominoes is such a case. It is simpler
than the dietoss in that the die-chain is a linkage of dis-
associated events while the domino-chain is a linkage of sequen-
tial repetitions of one event, namely the toppling of one domino
into another. And so this is an enormous simplification, for we
may examine the workings of the chain by inspecting the workings
of one link. Now selecting any link except the first or the last,
we see that one falling domino upsets another, which falls into a
third, which begins to fall before the second domino completes
its fall. And then we have a new falling domino, and the whole
affair repeats until the last domino topples.
Then what is the effect of pushing one of the dominoes into a
second? It is seen that the immediate effect is to topple the
second comino. However, before the effect is complete, a third
domino is falling, and so on. The effect seems rather diffuse;
perhaps it can be clarified.
Let us observe very carefully, using some of the physicists'
theory, what happens as the first domino of the set is pushed in-
to the second. As the first is tipped past its balance point
toward the second, it falls with increasing speed until it strikes
the second. Due to the impact, the second begins to move, and the
first continues to move for a short while. The second, having
been struck by the first, moves, and falls into the third. The
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second then continues to move for a short while.
Such would be the usual description of the events of the
domino-chain game. But what is cause and what is effect among
these events'!'
Coarsely speaking, the falling of the first domino is the
cause of the falling of the second. But we see immediately that
most of the falling of the first domino has nothing to do with
the falling of the second, so we modify our description of the
cause and say that the cause of the fallin.-: of the second is the
striking of the second by the first. However, this is incomplete,
for the impact must be sufficiently vigorous to topple the second.
Further, the second raiist not be, say, glued in place; it must be
free to move. Neither can there be a sudden calamity which de-
stroys both dominoes before the second begins to move, and so on;
obviously the causal conditions are somewhat complex. If we at-
tempt to simplify by saying "The second must be free to move and
the first must strike the second with sufficient force, then we
have made a curious statement. It is analytic, yet it encompasses
conditions such as that the second domino shall not be glued in
place, that no atom bomb shall vaporize both dominoes, and that
the impact shall be greater than a certain number of dynes of
force.
Now what of the complexity of the effect?
Again, coarsely speaking, the effect of pushing over the first
domino is that the second falls. However, the second domino does
not come to rest until it has struck the third, which in turn does
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not come to rest until it has struck the fourth, and so on, until
the last domino has fallen. Then the effect of pushinp^ over the
first domino is that not only the second falls, but also the last.
But why restrict the effects to those upon the second domino, or
even the last domino? For some hapless ant may be crushed; there
is also a wind from the falling domino; there is a sound as one
domino strilces another; and the falling produces a more stable
position for the first domino.
All of which shows that for the case of the falling domino,
the causal relations are complex, although not as complex as for
the case of the dietoss. Perhaps a yet simpler case can be found.
Such a case may be the following: the pulling upon a door
and its consequent opening. The cause is simply the exertion of
muscular force upon the door-handle; the effect is the opening of
the door. However, opening is a sub-class of moving, so perhaps
a more accurate description of the effect would be to say that
the pulling upon the doorhandle moves the doorhandle which in turn
moves the door. But there are still the assumptions that the door
is free to move and that it is pulled with sufficient force.
The given cases indicate that a cause is complex, containing
assumptions as well as active agents. And the previous argument
for non-duplicate and independent causal sequences, v/hose in-
itiations are also independent, shows that spontaneity is more
clearly a true description of the origin of changes than would be
thought by those who maintain that every change has a cause.
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But does this mean that since there are multitudinous inde-
pendent and non-duplicate sources for changes, that each change
is itself independent and so requires no antecedents? V-'hich is
to say that no change need have a cause';'
But does this mean that since there are multitudinous inde-
pendent and non-duplicate sources for changes, that each change is
itself independent and so requires no antecedents? IJ'Tiich is to
say that n£ change need have a cause?
This extreme position is uncomfortable, for we often say that
v;e have found the cause for a phenomenon; our habit is to invent
causes v;here v;e can find none (this hiibit is responsible for much
of the nonsense one hears).
Since the origins of causal sequences are independent, one
does not knov; where they begin. Does one know when they end?
Consider the execution of Charles I. The ax was the cause,
the death was the effect (that is, the effect which interests us;
we do not care about the noise made by the ax).
Does not this causal sequence terminate with the decapitation?
No, for the decapitation is a cause for the death. But surely the
sequence is now completed. But the death is a cause for still
other effects, and so on. This would mean that the sequence con-
taining the death of Charles I is still "in action," for it has
had at the very least enough long-lasting effects that it is men-
tioned in this thesis - more importantly, it still colors British
political thought (although perhaps not very much); it is a stand-
ard case of regicide; who knows what Britain would now be like
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except for his execution, etc.
Attenuation of Causal Sequences
But certainly the execution was more significant in 1660
than it is in 1960. Thus it has faded from memory (in a derived
sense of memory, of course, since the spectators are all dead),
its context no longer is a vital political issue, and so on. But
there is another reason for its loss of significance, and I should
like to call this reason "attenuation."
Now it is true that the train of political consequents of the
execution can be followed for a time before they become diffused
with other political problems and so lose significance. But It
is also true that there are many effects of the dropping of the
ax which are present for spectators but which are ignored by
political historians.
V/hat are some of these effects'' The beheading, the noise of
the impact, the wear upon the block, the death of Charles I, the
emotional impact upon the soectators and upon those who later
learn of the event, the dropoin;^ of the head (and other grisly de-
tails), and then there are the political consequences, ^ach of
these effects has consequents, which in turn have consequents.
Then the effects of the ax stroke proliferate; which of the mani-
fold branches shall we follow?
Obviously the effects on the ax quickly cease to be important;
for the ax is cleaned and sharpened and is soon ready for another
occasion. But of course perhaps a museum would want the fateful
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ax, in which case a new ax must be obtained for the executioner.
This calls for capital expenditure, etc. But whatever the results
of the wear on the ax, these results are called "side effects,"
meaning that such are not the effects which most interest us. The
same epithet disposes of such effects as the noise made by the
stroke, the wind from the passage of the ax through the air, and
so on. Then what is "the" effect (that is, which effect most in-
terests us)? That would depend upon who we are, for the friends
of Charles I had more interest in his death than in the subse-
quent political events, and historians care more for the politics.
And the headsman may have been more concerned with the danger to
his ax than with the victim or the state of the nation after the
execution.
All this is analogous to cases (M) and (N) given earlier, in
that a fairly simple event has complicated important effects. The
mechanism for explaining the complexity has been explained by N,
R. Hanson;^ the following few pages are loosely patterned after
his ideas.
Some Fallacious Arguments for the Simple First Cause
How explain the complexity of the effect of a simple first
cause*^ For when one considers the multitudes of different "fives"
which might result from a single dietoss, and since it has been
said that an independent and non-duplicate causal chain produces
N. R. Hanson, "Causal Chains," Mind, July, 1956, 55: 289-
311,
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each of them, then it v/ould seem as if each discernible bit of the
effect of the ax-stroke must also be the result of such a chain.
The answer is that the "cause" is not simple.
Due to the time-lapse during the dropping of the ax, it might
seem as if the complexity of the cause could be explained by say-
ing that the cause was itself a causal sequence, each member of
v/hich produces one of the above list of effects. But this only
restates the proliferation of the causal sequence, for it is seen
that the presence of the cause for the drooping of the ax is more
immediate than the cause for, say, the subsequent political events.
That is, one cause is immediately present in space and time; the
other is not so present but becomes known at a later time.
How do considerations of the "presence" of a cause aid in ex-
plaining the proliferation of causal sequences? 'P'ach cause is the
junction of several causal sequences, but before exploring this it
may be well to answer the following objection to the idea that
there may be many independent causal sequences.
It might be said that there need not be two non-duplicate and
independent causal sequences to explain two results of a dietoss,
for two causal sequences might be duplicates until, say, the time
of the falling, and then a wind might come along and disturb one
of the sequences sufficiently to produce a face different from the
face produced by the other toss.
But this objection will not save the idea of the first cause,
for to shift the problem to the wind is to ask why the wind was
different in the two cases, and then we must analyze two contrary
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wind-sequences. And if the conclusion that there are three first
causes (one for the two dietosses, and one each for the cases of
wind and no-wind) is to be avoided, then the question must again
be shifted to another pair of sequences in order to explain the
two different wind-sequences. But now there are four first
causes: one for the dietosses, one for the winds, and one each for
the two different states of the wind.
It will be noticed that t>ie dletoss sequence after it has
been disturbed by the v/ind is still regarded as a die-sequence
and not as a v/ind-seq\ience. But if we were more interested in
the wind than in the outcome of the dietoss, we would follow the
wind after it had met the die, and not the die after it had met
the wind. The two sequences might be said to meet, affect one
another and then pass on in their separate and non-duplicate
ways. Yet of the two ways, we would say that one is the dietoss-
sequence altered by the wind, and that the other was the wind-
sequence altered by the die. Then the result of these two inter-
secting sequences is not to be known as the upshot of one power-
ful sequence modified by a weaker sequence, for we cannot say
which of the sequences is more powerful. Were we more interested
in the wind-sequence, we would say that it_ was the more powerful
since it was only slightly affected by the tiny influence of the
falling die; and were we more interested in the die-sequence, we
would remark that the influence of the wind was tiny, although
enough to affect the outcome of the dietoss. Then the issue is
not which sequence is the more powerful, but which sequence inter-
ests us the more.
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It should be easily seen that to speak of a single causal
sequence is to ignore these extraneous sequences, which intersect
with each other and v/ith the "single" sequence, and which influ-
ence events in all chains subsequent to but not events prior to
the intersection. And soon we have a network of interesting
sequences, in which, except for our interests, the path of any
putative sequence could not and would not be traced. For example,
in tracing backwards in time the sequence leading to a "five" on
a dietoss, we soon come to the time when the die is falling, and
now which way shall we proceed? Along the wind-sequence, or
along the throwing (of the die) sequence? Any selection between
the two is arbitrary. But if we say that both must be included
in the continuation of the tracing, then soon we are following
a bewildering number of sequences, all of which we must follow,
for at every intersection all of the intersecting sequences are
relevant and contribute to the overall effect.
Another objection may be raised at this point, namely that
the outcome of the dietoss is due more to the throwing than to
the influence of the wind after it was thrown. The answer to
this is as follows: it is true that after throwing, the wind has
no effect on fallings in_ general, but it is also true that the
particular bouncing under discussion differs from the other bounc-
ings only in that it has been disturbed by the wind. If someone
were to say that the bouncing would not have occurred without the
throwing, then his objection can be met by saying that the par-
ticular bouncing under discussion would not have occurred without
the wind.
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For all the above reasons, the idea of a single simple first
cause must be abandoned, and in its place is a multitude of such
causes. With one such cause, spontaneity and uniqueness is a
characteristic of it alone. However, with the multitude of in-
dependent non-duplicate causes, spontaneity is rampant in their
beginnings. Further, the tracing of causal sequences (or chains;
the terras are used interchangeably) is arbitrary and governed by
our interests rather than by any intrinsic quality of causes and
effects (later, this idea will be more fully developed).
Thus the idea of causal sequence as being discoverable, as
is a battleship's anchor chain, must be viewed with suspicion,
and possibly the idea must be abandoned.
But what of the simplest and shortest of the sequences, such
as those found when an arrow is shot from a bow, or when billiard
balls collide? Is the choice of single causes for the effects
as arbitrary as for the more remote parts of the longer and more
complex sequences, or is our choice of "the" cause for a simple
effect (if there are such effects) more nearly controlled by the
actual causal situation?
On Simple Causal Sequences
Before considering in detail the elementary causal relation
which holds in the simplest cause-effect sequence, I wish to pre-
sent the following list of problems, the last two of which will
be considered.
How does the cause differ from the effect?
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How does one causal relation differ from another?
How can something produce a different thing?
How can something produce anything at all*?*
To what extent is the cause distinct from the effect?
To what extent is the cause united with the effect? And if
there is unity, what sort of unity is it?
Kvery cause-effect sequence contains the follov/ing classes
of components: the effect, the cause, and the absence of hidden
preventers which would if present thwart the operation of the
cause. We have seen that *'a cause" and "an effect" are each
usually general terms which include many possible situations:
thus "a five" is the effect of a dietoss, but there are multi-
tudes of die-positions which we call "fives." As Rusell has
suggested,-^ if we v/ere to closely specify the effect as being
one particular member of the numerous class of fives, then a
repetition of that particular five probably would not recur out
of the very large number of possible fives. Also, "cause" is a
most diffuse term, for the throwing of a die is a cause for a
multitude of distinct resulting die-positions; but the causes for
one particular five out of the class of fives are so numerous and
complex that probably such a complex would not recur and so
neither would the highly-specified five under discussion.
Consider the case of the colliding billiard-balls. As the
simplest of such cases, consider that one wherein a rolling cue-
ball strikes another ball in such a way that the struck ball
Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Yogi , p, 188
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moves in the same direction as that in which the cue-ball was
moving before impact.
What does one perceive in this case? We see the cue-ball
rolling and we see the space between the cue-ball and the target
diminish, then we hear a sharp click and see the target move away
from its former stationary position. Is there any sort of neces-
sity here?
The usual idea is that there is no necessity, for we can
easily imagine that the target ball does not move, or that the
cue-ball in some mysterious fashion passes through the target with-
out any change in its motion, or perhaps the target moves off at
some fantastic angle.
But we would be astonished by these occurrences, and would
look for some "secret cause" (Hume's term) to explain them; we
would say that a secret cause explains such deviations from con-
stant conjunction. But v/hile there may not be any necessary con-
nection between cause and effect, we yet feel that there is some
sort of connection between them. There seems to be two sources
for this feeling other than Hume's constant-association-of-ideas.
Both of these sources rely upon analogy. We can remember an
uninterrupted motion of a billiard-ball from one cushion to
another, and then we can relate this single motion to the motions
of two billiard balls which are chosen such that one strikes the
other, their motions being along the same line traced by the mo-
tion of the single ball. That is, we consider the motions of the
two balls to be one motion which is transferred from one ball to
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the other by the collision.
The other source for the belief in some sort of connection
beyond that of constant conjunction between cause and effect in
the billiard-ball collision comes about from a tactual analogy:
we know the feeling of the impact of a billiard ball against our
hand, whether the ball strikes the hand or vice versa. Then wo
can think of the hand as being placed between the two billiard
balls, so that the moving ball strikes the hand and the hand then
strikes the stationary ball. And since when a ball strikes our
hand the hand moves, and since when our hand strikes a ball the
ball moves, it is a simple step to imagine the first ball striking
the second without any internosing hand. Thus the impact of the
first ball upon the second affects the second in the same manner
as the impact of our hand would affect the second. And so we
form an analogy between the collision of two billiard balls and
the collision of our hand with a billiard ball, and this analogy
gives us the feeling that there is something beyond constant con-
junction in the billiard-ball collision, even though the ball-hand
collision is still merely constant conjunction.
But is there any necessity in these extra connections? There
is none apparent in the "second source," for the source depends
upon the relation between the collision of the hand with the ball
and the subsequent motion of the struck body (whether hand or ball),
But there seems to be something in the first source which may turn
out to be necessity. To bring this "something" into focus, let us
now turn to another simple case of causality.
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Such a case occurs whsn we pull upon a door. If the door
opens, that is the effect; and if the door does not open, we as-
sume that some hidden preventer does not allov/ it to open (we
look to see if the door is locked, jammed, nailed shut, etc.).
If we assume that the door does open, then the case is at its
simplest. Then let us examine the case carefully.
Taking first a linguistic approach, we may ask whether pul-
ling upon a door causes it to open in the way that being a bach-
elor causes one to be unmarried, for there is logical necessity
in the case of the unmarried bachelor.
The answer is that in one sense, there is such a logically-
necessary connection, for one meaning of the word "pull" applies
to cases wherein the exertion of a force results in a motion, as
when a child pulls a toy wagon. However, this sense of the word
(often designated by the term "pull along") is often not dis-
tinguished from another sense in which pulling does not result in
motion, as when a child pulls at an automobile. In one of these
senses, motion is analytically included, but in the other it is
not; hence there is necessity in one of the senses but not in
the other.
However, an interesting note now arises. As we contemplate
pulling upon a door, which sense of "pull" is applicable? And in
general, how do v/e knov/ which sense of the word "pull" is to be
applied to cases of pulling'l' When motion results, as v/hen the
child pulls a wagon, the sense of "pull" appropriate is obviously
the one including motion. And it is equally clear which sense is
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meant when the child tugs at an automobile. But before the child
acts, we can only guess which sense is to be applied, even though
experience may show that the child has in the past been able to
produce motion by pulling upon a wagon but not upon an automo-
bile, and even though we may be able to calculate the child's
muscle power and the force required to move various objects.
Then past experience tells us which sense of the word is to be
used, and so there is no necessity, but only a description of
experience. Therefore even though one sense of "pull" does an-
alytically include motion, we do not know whether that sense is
applicable to a case of pulling until experience shows whether
that case was characterized by motion.
Then the way in which pulling upon a door causes it to open
is not the way in which being a bachelor causes one to be un-
married.
It may be thought that a cause is one thing and that an ef-
fect is quite another thing, with some sort of connection between
the two. But in many cases it 'vill be found that there are com-
mon elements (either repetitions or persistences), or that the
effect is merely the cause seen from a different viewpoint, or
that in some other way the distinction betv/eon cause and effect
is arbitrary. Then because of the arbitrary distinctions between
them and the common elements joining them the cause is separable
only linguistically from the effect, and thus we may say that
apart from our arbitrary distinctions they are one entity. How-
ever, their "unity" (i.e. singleness of being) is not
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linguistically derived. This is the view I would like to estab-
lish.
Consider a fox examining a squirrel. The fox cannot be rea-
sonably accused of being linguistically aware of the squirrel, but
we can see the fox*s eyes following the motions of the squirrel,
and then we might see the fox chase the swuirrel, following every
dodge and twist the squirrel makes. In the same way, we observe
the fox and the squirrel, Pref5umably, then, our observation of
the squirrel is much like the fox's observation of the squirrel,
and except for differences in sense-organs, coloration given to
the squirrel, and other details of the appearance of the squir-
rel, both the fox and we collate the appearances into the object
which the fox chases and which we call "squirrel," The results
of this collative process are v/hat I would like to call "non-
linguistic unity" and "non-linguistic self-identity." The dif-
ference between the two is that "unity" will be used for things
usually considered discrete, while "self-identity" will be used
for emphasizing the coherence of the many anpearances of one
object. Both will be sub-classes of "perceptive necessity."
On Changes
For changeless things (e,g, the past), the notion of non-
linguistic self-identity does not present any great difficulties,
either in coraurehension or in acceptance, for it requires no
words for, say, an animal to find its burrow after a day's for-
aging. Neither does it require any such acts for us to drive an
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automobils over a familiar road; the curves and hills are there
unchanged.
But if some sort of non-linguistic self-identity can be
found in changing things, the way v/ill be more nearly cleared to
find the same sort of identity between cause and effect, and so
perceptive necessity.
Phenomenologically speaking, there are two ways by which
anything may change: we may perceive it from a different aspect:
or from one aspect we may perceive that its appearance is dif-
ferent from its appearance a moment ago,
7/e have already considered the class of cases in which an
object is viewed from many directions and distances, with result-
ing many appearances which are integrated into one object. This
class v/ill not be considered further, since we do not consider
there to be a causal relation between the different aspects of
an object which are due to viewing the object from different dis-
tances and directions. However, such changes in appearance do
indicate motion of an object relative to an observer, and such
motion is an effect of some cause (we say). This last observa-
tion is made in order to distinguish this class of cases from
the other class wherein there is a change in appearance but no
change in distance or direction, as when we see a stone break a
v/indow.
The problem of change is a knotty one, for if something
changes, then it is something else. Then how can there be iden-
tity between a thing before change and a thing after change*^
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I suggest that to say that a thing has changed is to say
that a class has a different membership. As an illustration, con-
sider the statement, "The smokestack has changed," meaning that a
certain large brick structure is not as it was a moment ago.
Upon hearing such a statement, we are likely to ask, "How has it
changed; in what respect is it different?" The reply can be
various: we may say that the atoms are different, or that the
bricks are different, or that the shape is different, or that the
whole thing has fallen down and so it is all different, or that
it has been painted, and so on.
But what does it mean to say that a brick is different*^ The
same battery of questions may be applied to the brick as was ap-
plied to the smokestock: that is, the brick has been painted,
or broken with a hammer, or it is composed of radio-active atoms
which have decayed, and so on. And what is it to say that a
radio-active atom is different? How have its parts (or the v/hole
)
changed?
The purpose of the above line of questioning is to reduce
changing entities into their simplest component parts; once this
is done we may ask what it is like for one of these "atomic"
parts to change - this latter question will throw light on the
nature of the change of the "molecular" objects such as smoke-
stacks •
What is it to say that one of these "atomic" parts has
changed? If X is an atomic part, then X may be replaced by
another atomic part (that is, one brick in the smokestack may be
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replaced by another). But if X is not replaced, but has simply
"changed," then the change is in the sense that the "molecular"
part containing X is changed when X is replaced (that is, the
entire ensemble of the smokestack is changed when X is replaced);
and X is not atomic but molecular. Then an atomic part of the
smokestack cannot (by definition) change in the sense that the
smokestack changes. But how can an atomic part change? By re-
placement v/ith another atomic part. For example, if a brick is
regarded as an atomic part of the smokestack, it can be replaced
by another brick; but it cannot change as the smokestack can
change, for then the brick becomes molecular and its parts be-
come atomic. And so change on the atomic level is accomplished
only by replacement of one atom with another.
Now when we consider a change of the complete smokestack,
another mode of change appears. This mode is usually what we
mean when we say that something has changed: some atomic parts
are replaced, but others are not; so that the object as a whole
presents some differences between its appearances before and
after change, but also some similarities. For example, when
the smokestack changes, bricks may be replaced and perhaps the
ensemble is painted. But there are other qualities which are
not altered: the location of the smokestack is unchanged; its
size, weight, and shape are not appreciably affected; etc. And
it is because of these persistent similarities that we say "the
smokestack has changed" rather than "where did that smokestack
go?" or "it is no longer a smokestack; it is now an elephant."
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And so the smokestack is a class of appearances, and when
the smokestack is changed, some but not all of the appearances
are removed or replaced by others. This kind of change I shall
call "XtoX'", meaning that X has become somewhat different, but
not sufficiently to warrant calling the resultant product by a
different letter. However, a complete change, such that all of
the appearances are removed or replaced, will be called an "XtoY"
change. Examples: when we say "the smokestack has become an
elephant" or perhaps "the caterpillar has become a butterfly,"
this is an XtoY change.
Now I would like to see whether causal changes of the XtoY
variety (if there are any such) have necessity, and afterwards
whether there is necessity in the XtoX' changes.
A case of causal changes of the XtoY variety (i.e. where the
effect is that something undergoes an XtoY change) would be the
effect of a solar supernova upon the planet Mercury. 'Vhat change
could be more complete? All of the molecules of matter in Mer-
cury would be separated from each other and then dissociated into
atoms, many of which would then be ionized or annihilated into
energy.
It might be objected that this is still not a complete
change, for the atoms of Mercury still exist; and even those which
are annihilated into energy by the sun't metabolism still exist
(although converted into the form of radiant energy) and are
moving by electromagnetic propagation and particular ejection
through space. However, although strictly speaking this objection
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is sound, it unfortunately destroys a useful concept for by the
objection we lose the concept of the finality and completeness of
torpedoed ships, novaed stars, dead animals, delivered children,
and so on.
But although the concept of utter change is useful in ex-
pressing termination, it is misleading in speaking of causal
changes, for it is an oversimplification: we neglect the debris
left by the novaed stars; we ignore the corpse; we do not con-
sider the sunken hulk on the ocean floor. On this basis, then,
the objection is sound; due to the residues of the changes men-
tioned there are no utterly complete changes (not even between
that which goes into the chrysalis and that which comes out) such
as would be labeled XtoY, for the components of the residue were
components of the ship before torpedoing or the sun before no-
vaing or the body while living. And the components of the adult
butterfly were components of the caterpillar. The steel is a
common component of both the ship and the hulk; the atoms are
components of both the sun and the nebula after supernova; the
body is common both to the live animal and to the corpse. And
in the chrysalis the atoms of the caterpillar are rearranged to
produce a butterfly.
Thus there can be XtoX» changes, X'toX»», X«»toX»»', and so
on (thus an egg becomes successively a caterpillar, a pupa, a
butterfly, a dead butterfly,..); but however far this process is
carried we do not produce XtoY changes: the change is always
X^to X^"-^. Complete annihilation would be an utter change of the
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XtoY var5.ety (where Y is nothingness), but there is no reason for
believing in complete annihilation: if we separate every brick
of the smokestack from every other brick and then convert the en-
tire mass into energy, the energy will spread out along a spher-
ical wavefront and become progressively more attenuated, but
there is no reason to believe that it ever completely disapt)ears
as would a sound wave (which becomes heat).
Then avoiding the misleading usage of the term "complete
change," it is seen that all changes are of the XtoX* variety,
wherein a class has some different members.
Then if X is a class with members a, b, c, d, e,..,; and if
X' is a class with members a,--, c, #, %,,,.; the change XtoX'
is allowable because of the members "a" and "c" which are common
to both. Without these two factors, the change would have be on
the impossible XtoY, which classes have no common members (this
includes the non-existent "annihilation" case where Y is a null
class )
•
X and X' are linked by the common members "a" and "c",
which persist while "b" is removed to another place and while "d"
is replaced by "#." These factors "a" and "c" furnish the per-
ceptive necessity between X and X» because of the "non-linguistic
self-identity" of the a's in X and X' and of the c's in X and X'.
That is, if "a" is a perceived factor in X and also in X', then
the presence of "a" in both X and X' justifies us in calling the
latter "X'" rather than "Y," Now of course the mere presence of
"a" in something is not enough to justify calling that thing "X»"
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unless "a" is restricted to a feature of "X", say, one smokestack,
For example, if "a" is the overall shape of a smokestack X, then
the same kind of shape "a" of other smokestacks is not sufficient
to justify calling them X»; that is, the smokestack X does not
change into the other smokestacks. But the presence of the shape
"a'' in smokestack X and in the sraokestack-after-painting X', where
the shape is in "the same place," is sufficient to justify our
calling the painted smokestack "X*" rather than "Y," And so the
shape "a" links X and X'. Further, this linkage is one describ-
able as being accomplished by non-linguistic self-identity. The
presence of one such common member is sufficient to establish
the identity. Now it may be that instead of keeping zhQ smoke-
stack under constant observation while it is being painted, we
see it on tv/o occasions, before and after painting. But in either
case, we know that the shape "a" is in "the same place," and so
it does not matter whether we see the shape persistently or
repetitiously.
Now the crucial question may be asked: can X be a cause for
X'?
On Causal Changes
A physical object, such as a smokestack, can undergo an
XtoX* change, but a physical object alone cannot be a cause; for
when one billiard ball strikes another, it is not the billiard
ball alone which is the cause of the motion of the second: it is
rather the billiard-ball-plus-its-raotion which is the cause.
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Similarly, it is not the Great V^'all of China alone which diverted
the barbarian tribes toward Rome, for the Great Wall (as an
object made of stone, dirt, etc.) would not have had such an
effect unless it had existed at the proper time and place. Thus
again the cause is complex, and therefore X can be a cause only
if X is complex. Then in the case of the billiard balls, X must
be "billiard-ball-plus-motion" if it is to be a cause; and in the
case of the Great Wall X can be a cause only if X includes not
only the physical Great l" all (which could be removed and taken
to the United States as castles have been taken) but also quali-
fications of time and place.
Then subject to the above considerations X can be a cause.
But can the effect of such a cause be described as X'? If v/e
have the picture of causality as being some sort of relation be-
tween entirely different things, then obviously the effect is
not X' but Y (so that the effect may be "entirely different").
And if our picture is that causality is some sort of relation
between things which except for the causal relation are entirely
different and distinct (this springs from the idea that any two
related things have at least the relation in common), then there
is still no justification for calling the effect X', for the re-
lation of cause to effect is not in any way the same as the re-
lation of effect to cause because of the time-order; and if cases
of simultaneous cause and effect are mentioned, then there is
still a difference between cause and effect: namely, that the
cause is "active" and the effect "passive,"
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Thon a causal relation, to be of the XtoX' type, cannot be
between entirely different things (X and Y) which are called
"cause" and "effect." It may be that there are causal relations
of the XtoY type, but I feel that necessity of any sort will be
very difficult to establish between cause and effect in such
cases. However, there might be necessity (due to non-linguistic
self-identity or non-linguistic unity) between cause and effect
in the XtoX* relation.
At this point I wish to introduce an analogy to the ideas of
this section. Consider the noise (or music, if you prefer) emit-
ted from a bagpipe. The sound is a din of steady pitches, pro-
duced by "drones" plus a melody played upon a clarinet-like tube
called the "chanter." Now the changes in sound from the chanter
would represent removal and replacement of the members of classes:
thus the total sound which includes one note of the chanter is
one class X, the total sound which includes the next note of the
chanter is ths next class X', then we have X'', and so on. The
notes from the drones represent the members common to all the
classes. Further, the ensemble covers a time-span as do most but
perhaps not all causal relations. Perhaps a case of causality can
be found which is assimilable to the bagpipe-noise model, so that
the total sound which includes one note from the chanter is the
cause and the total sound including the next note is the effect.
And since the drone's noise is deafening and overpowers the
chanter, we may easily think of the bagpipe-noise as a screech
with variations. So there would be non-linguistic self-identity
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in the tumult, due to its immense unity of impact upon the ear.
However, if it were a case of causality we v/ere considering, we
would shift the emphasis and describe the noise as melody v;ith
backgroiind harmony. In the earlier (predominant among non-lovera
of bagpipe music) interpretation, we emphasize the constants of
the entity under discussion (which is the entire mass of noise);
but in the later (predominant among lovers of bagpipe music) in-
terpretation, we emphasize the variables of the entity.
Vi/hich of these interpretations is more "natural?" That is,
which is the better description of reality? An objection here
would say: Can v/e not separate the sound of the chanter from
that of the drones and say that all of the perceptive necessity
in the total sound comes from the constancy of the sound of the
drones? So that the notes of the chanter are separable from
those of the drones, and then there is no non-linguistic unity
connecting the notes of the chanter? For the "illusion" of unity
comes from the impressive total effect of the bagpipe-music, and
properly speaking v/e cannot ignore the distinctions between the
chanter's notes and those of the drones.
This objection has its sting from an assumption that the
variables of the bagpipe-music are more important than the con-
stants for determining the nature of the music. The assumption
is exposed and rejected by remarking that our interests rather
than some pov/er in the cause determine what we shall call the
effect of a causal matrix. It is true that a dynamite charge may
topple a smokestack, but although it is an impressive sight to see
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a large brick smokestock being dynamited, that sight is only one
of many effects: should there be miscalculation and the smoke-
stack fall into a house, our interests are more with the house
than with the smokestack. Similarly, the launching of a large
rocket is impressive, but the scientists watch their instruments
rather than the rocket. However, there is an impressive unity
connecting everything concerned with the rocket-launch and there
is an impressive unity in the dynamiting of a large smokestack.
For the bagpipe model, this unity includes all of the sounds, as
well as the sight of the colorful and puffing musical Scotsman.
The perception of this unity is absolutely Indispensable to
the argument of this thesis. Unfortunately, such perception has
some of the disreputable qualities of the insights of the mystic,
in that both the perception and the insights are most difficult
to communicate. When the mystic exclaims that the World is One,
that is on a large scale what I mean by saying that the bagpipe-
music is One or that the toppling smokestack or the rocketlaunch
is One,
Unity Between Cause and Effect
But is not such unity destroyed by the lack of unity in the
first-cause mass of independent causes? That is, cannot every
facet of the noise of the bagpipe be independent from the others
as each cause in the bundle of First Causes is independent from
the other first causes?
The difficulty is resolved by the following considerations.
Although the idea of causal unity (that is, a single first cause)
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is an illusion if applied to the mass of first causes, we do not
have the same reason for saying that the idea of perceptive unity
between cause and effect cannot be applied to cases of causality
assimilable to the bagpipe-noise model, for there is a different
sort of unity in the two instances: it is much less of a gen-
eralization to say that the bagpipe-music is a unity than to say
that the entire universe is a unity; further, we do not perceive
the first causes but we do_ perceive cause and effect in cases
assimilable to the bagpipe-music model. For this reason there
cannot be any perceptive necessity that the Universe is One, for
we do not perceive the first causes; but perhaps there may be
such necessity in cases of causality fitting the bagpipe-model.
It may be objected that the perception of unity, being flex-
ible and subjective and undemonstrable, is a very poor ground
upon which to erect a structure of necessity in causal relations.
However, to deny unity is to that extent to admit spontaneity,
for the fewer things united, the greater the number of acts of
spontaneity required to produce a given mass of entities. That
is, if things a, b, c, d, e, f,...are united causally or per-
ceptively, then one spontaneous generation will produce all of
them; but if those same things have no such unity, then a sep-
arate spontaneous generation is needed for each of them. The
less spontaneity, the less the shock to our scientific prejudice
that every change has a cause.
Now despite the Impossibility of a single simple first cause,
we cannot say with the mystic that "The Universe is One; that is.
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th-^re is neither perceptive nor causal unity connecting every-
thing in the universe with everything else (but the mystic might
have some other kind of unity in mind; that will not concern us).
But does that require us to deny unity even to such modest
agglutinations as the unity of the bagpipe music? If the answer
is In the affirmative, a reasonable extension of the process of
denying unity would lead us then to say that every change is
spontaneous and that every grouping of appearances or changes or
whatnot is arbitrary. Then there would be no unity among the many
appearances of a penny.
My argument is that although we customarily distinguish the
pulling upon a door from its opening, an equally plausible view
of the world would ignore such a distinction, Vv'ithout the dis-
tinction, there is non-linguistic self-identity between cause and
effect, and thus perceptive necessity that if the cause occurs
the effect will occur.
But there is a problem in assimilating the opening-door case
to the bagpipe-music model, for the model requires not only ele-
ments analogous to the sound from the chanter, but also elements
analogous to the sound of the drones. Any of the many changes
which occur when a door is opened may be analogous to the changing
sound from the chanter, but what elements will be analogous to
the constant sound of the drones?
The pulling is such a constant, for it is present in both
the cause and the effect. Certainly it will be accepted that the
pulling is present in the cause (along with stipulations that the
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door to be free to move, etc.), but that the pulling is present
in the effect is by no means so clear.
The objection to the presence of the pulling in the effect
has its force from a distinction which I believe is gratuitous.
This is the distinction between the effects of earlier and later
portions of the pulling; it v/ill be said that the effect of the
earlier pulling does not include the later pulling.
The truth of the objection is obvious. However, I question
its application. For the continuous application of force, while
not an effect of an earlier part of itself, is still present in
matrices of the effects of earlier parts. But the above will be
rejoined with the following: what haopens when the force is re-
moved? The effect continues (the door continues to open), but
the force is no longer present, and therefore its continued
oresence seems accidental to the continuation of the effect, and
therefore the presence in the effect of a continuation of the
force which was in the cause could as well be absent.
This rejoinder is serious. I cannot meet it and so must
search for another case to fit the bagpipe-music model.
Such a case is the row of toppling dominoes, and the drone
here is an entity I shall call "transfer of motion." Since the
motion of a first domino into a second is the cause of the motion
of the second, then the motion of the second is both effect (of
the motion of the first) and a cause (of the motion of a third
domino), with the motion of the second being a perceptive, ncn-
linguistic unity of a very clear sort. Then to call the earlier
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parts of the motion "an effect" and the later parts "a cause" Is
to be grossly arbitrary, for the entire motion is equally both
cause and effect.
The above method of identifying cause and effect appears to
be sophistical, for what is made into a unity is not a cause and
its effect, but the effect of one cause and the cause of another
effect. This is easily seen if we recall the temporal order in a
causal sequence, wherein a cause produces an effect which is the
cause of another effect, and so on. Then one event can easily be
both the effect of an earlier cause and the cause of a later
event, and no one would deny this. But once the reader's sus-
picion of rank sophistry is somewhat abated, then the case of the
falling dominoes exhibits perceptive necessity between cause and
effect,
CONCLUSION
If the falling dominoes are regarded as one entity, then to
deny the logical connection betwe-^^n its parts is to subvert that
fuzzy concept denoted variously by the words "oneness," "unity,"
"identity," "singularity," etc. But there is an oppressive co-
hesiveness joining the events of the chain of toppling dominoes.
We are not in error in speaking of the unity of certain objects
of perception, such as lengths, shapes, and sizes. We speak of
the unity of a circle, the unity of a band of labor unions, the
ensemble effect of an orchestra, "togetherness" in family rela-
tions, and so on. Then why recoil from attributing unity to the
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falling dominoes? It is true that parts can be found in the
chain, but parts can be found in the other given examples of
unity; so the individual dominoes and their fallings should not
prevent the feeling of unity produced by the smooth connectedness
of the falling chain.
If this unity is admitted, all parts of the chain of falling
dominoes are necessarily connected by their being facets of the
same unity. (cf. tautology-argument, p.Sl at".) Since we can
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RFLATING THF PRFSFNT THESIS TO THOSE OP
CERTAIN LEADING PHILOSOPHERS
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Most persons have the idea that a dropped stone falls be-
cause it has always done so in the past - when asked why this
occurs, their answer is likely to be "gravity." This word intro-
duces a new idea, namely that a stone falls not merely because it
has always done so, but because something makes it do so. To
link dropping and falling by gravity is satisfactory to common
sense, and the further questions of the connections between drop-
ping, gravity, and falling are ignored.
However, philosophers do not ignore these questions, as the
following pages will attest. Much of the discussion concerns the
Hume -Leibniz-Kant melee, but others will also be found; all in
the following order: Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz,
Kant, and Schopenhauer.
Aristotle
The current view places what is of necessity in
the process of production, just as if one were to sup-
pose that the wall of a house necessarily comes to be
because what is heavy is naturally carried downwards
and what is light is carried to the top, wherefore the
stones •.• take the lowest place, ••• and wood at the
top of all .... Whereas, though the wall does not come
to be without these it is not due to these, except as
its material cause .... Similarly in all other things
which involve production for an end; the product can-
not come to be without things which have a necessary
nature, but it is not due to these (except as mate-
rial); it comes to be for an end. For instance, why
is a saw such as it is? To affect so-and-so and for
the sake of so-and-so. This end, however, cannot be
realized unless the saw is made of iron. It is,
therefore, necessary for it to be made of iron, if we
are to have a saw and perform the operation of saw-
ing. What is necessary, then, is necessary on a hy-
pothesis, it is not a result necessarily determined
by antecedents. Necessity is in the matter, while
"that for the sake of which" is in the definition.
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Necessity in mathematics is in a way similar to
necessity in things which come to be through the opera-
tion of nature. But since a straight line is what it
is, it is necessary that the angles of a triangle
should equal two right angles, ...though if the angles
are not equal to two right angles, then the straight
line is not what is is either. But in things which
come to be for an end the reverse is true. If the end
is to exist or does exist, that also which precedes it
will exist or does exist; otherwise just as there, if
the conclusion is not true, the premise will not be
true, so here the end or "that for the sake of which"
will not exist ....
The necessary in nature, then, is plainly what we
call by the name of matter, and the changes in it.
Both causes must be stated by the physicist, but espe-
cially the end, for that is the cause of the matter,
and not vice versa .... Perhaps the necessary is pres-
ent also in the definition. For if one defines the
operation of sawing as being a certain kind of dividing,
then this cannot come about unless the saw has teeth of
a certain kind; and these cannot be unless it is made
of iron. For in the definition too there are some
parts that are, as it were, its matter.
1
Plainly, however, that cause is first which we call the
final one. For this is the reason, and the reason forms the
starting point, alike in works of art and works of nature.
2
For there is absolute necessity, manifesting it-
self in eternal phenomena, and there is conditional
necessity, manifested in everything that is generated
by nature, .... For if a house or other such final
object is to be realized, it is necessary that such
and such material shall exist, ... (and production,
and motion), ... until the end and final result is
reached, for the sake of which each prior thing is
produced and exists.^
Aristotle may he said to hold that the effect determines the
cause; a present end operated teleologically in the past to
*• Aristotle, Physics , pp. 179-187.
^ Aristotle, Parts of iinim.als , p. 45.
Loc. cit.
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produce the present, yet the end is also regarded as an effect.
"End" is thus equivocally to mean "result" and "purpose."
In leading us into the past in pursuit of aboriginal pur-
pose, Aristotle eventually presents us with a half-hundred "un-
moved movers," which are the initiators of motion. These movers
are each sovereign; there is no systemic unity bonding them to-
gether in a manner analogous to human political establishments; in
contrast to Leibniz who organizes causal quanta under a God.
There is nothing in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics to sug-
gest that the unmoved movers compel motion, in the strong sense
in which the Leibnizian God inexorably regulates. Causal neces-
sity for Aristotle is limited to what is necessitated that a
purpose be fulfilled. For while a saw cannot be unless it is
made of iron, it does not come to be because it is made of iron;
rather, it comes to be because we wish to saw,
A question arises here. Apnarently Aristotle would see
nothing wrong with saying, "The patient dies of yellow fever;
therefore he was bitten by an Anopheles mosquito;" for he holds
the similar view that if something is a saw, it is made of iron.
Now, we would hold that death of yellow fever necessitates an
Anopheles bite. And just as for us yellow fever includes with
near-analyticity an Anopheles bite, so for Aristotle being a saw
includes with near-analyticity being made of iron. But of course,
nowadays saws are made of steel, and it is no longer necessary
that they be made of iron. Then why did Aristotle consider iron
a necessary ingredient of saws? Was it iron which was part of
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his conception, or was it "substance suitable for saws?" With
iron being the only such substance he knew? In either of these
cases, his material necessity is eliminated, except in the
vacuous sense by which saws must be made of some material since
they are material objects. Any necessity would then reside in
the definition.
Further, to say "sawing cannot come about unless the saw has
teeth of a certain kind" means merely that the teeth must be
suitable for sawing - we cannot say even that it means that the
teeth must be like successful known teeth, for new styles of saw
teeth may be developed, "Teeth of a certain kind" does not de-
note any class of material saw teeth; it means that a saw tooth
is called such only because we can saw with it (except for
derivative senses, as in a type of electronic waveform known as
"sawtooth" ).
Necessary connection in Aristotle, for the case discussed,
reduces to analytic necessity. He does not mention any powers
which enforce that effects shall follow causes,
John Locke
George Berkeley
Lock and Berkeley both ascribe causation to powers, and
both anticipate Hume by denying any perception by us of such
powers. Locke calls them unknown; Berkeley tells us that orderly,
or causal, succession is due to the power of the will of God. In
either case, the remarks apply which will be found in the dis-
cussion of Leibnizian power. Yet it will be interesting to
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examine their own expressions of the powers.
Locke writes:
In the notice that our senses take of the con-
stant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe
that several particulars, both qualities and sub-
stances, begin to exist, and that they receive this
their existence from the due application and opera-
tion of some other being. Prom this observation we
get our idea of cause and effect.^
"... whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power
somewhere able to make that change, ..."^
Berkeley, in his major work, states:
All ... the things which we perceive are visibly
inactive - there is nothing of power or agency in-
cluded in them. So that one idea or object of thought
cannot produce or make any alteration in another. "^
We perceive a continual succession of ideas ....
There is therefore some cause of these ideas ...
which produces and changes them ••• it remains there-
fore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active
substance or Spirit.^
When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not
in my pov/er to choose whether I shall see or no, . .
.
the ideas imprinted (on my senses) are not creatures
of my will. There is therefore some other 'Will or
Spirit that produces thera.^
It is historically interesting to note how the inchoate
skepticism of Locke and Berkeley attains more complete develop-
ment in the philosophy of David Hume. Hume rejects causal powers;
John Locke, ^ssay Concerning Human Understanding , II, 26,
^ Ibid., II, 21, 4.
George Berkeley, Principle of Human Knowledge , p. 207,
*Ibid.
, p, 208,
^ Ibid., p. 209.
1.
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and at the risk of over-interpretation, it seens that Locke and
Berkeley, had they been auccesaor:^ of Hume, would likely have
agreed,
David Hume
David Hume is the most celebrated of the English empiri-
cists. The clarity and power of his writing, coupled with a
skeptical position, have great persuasive force.
On the question whether there is necessity betv/een cause and
effect, Hume is starkly agnostic, saying that we know only that
cause and effect are constantly conjoined:
Should anyone pretend to define a cause by saying
that it is something productive of another, 'tis evi-
dent he v/ould say nothing. For v/hat does he mean by
production ? Can he give any definition of it, that
will not be the same with that of caiisation" If he
can; I desire that it may be produced. If he cannot;
here he runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term
instead of a def inition,-*-
Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as
the cause of motion in another. When r;e consider
these objects with the utmost attention, we find only
that the one body approaches the other, .... 'Tis in
vain to rack ourselves with farther thought and re-
flection upon this subject. We can go no farther in
considering this particular instance.^
It appears that, in single operations of bodies
we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any-
thing but one event following another. So that, upon
the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature,
any one instance of connection, which is conceivable
by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate.
One event follows another, but we never can observe
David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature , p, 379,
^ Ibid., p, 378,
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any type between them. They seem conjoined, but never
connected,^
The idea of time is not derived from a particular
impression mixed up with others, and plainly distin-
guishable from them; but arises altogether from the
manner , in which impressions appear to the mind, with-
out making one of their number. Five notes played on
a flute give us the impression and idea of time, though
time be not a sixth impression, which presents itself
to the hearing or any other of the senses.^
All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a
comparison , and a discovery of those relations, either
constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear
to each other. This comparison we may make, either
when both the objects are present to the senses, or
when only one. When both the objects are present to
the senses along with the relation, we call this per-
ception rather than reasoning.^
Hume attempts to place all ideas into the class of those
arising from the senses. However, it is difficult to place time
and causality in the class of sensibles, as may be seen in Hume^s
own words above for the case of time: Hume presents as an ex-
planation of time an Invocation of the "manner" in which impres-
sions appear to the mind, "Manner" is by no means clearly an
empirical idea. Yet when Hume speaks of two or more objects
present to the senses along with the relation, he perhaps allows
that "manner," or relation, is perceivable. Then why cannot
necessary connection be such a manner or relation?
The thesis argues for such a perceivable connection. In or-
der to explore the possibility of its existence, it would not be
irrelevant to present here the thought of a modern writer.
•' David Hume, Essays Moral , Political , and Literary , p. 61
** David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature I, iii, 2.
^ Ibid., I, ii, 3,
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When the word 'connection' is uttered, ,,. most
of us ••• think of a ,., chain link, and Hume doubt-
less did likewise. How, no such object ... is per-
ceptible tying together the pouring of acid and the
rise in temperature of the water ... therefore we say,
there is no connection observable between them. But a
moment's reflection forces us to admit that even a
rope or a chain link, where they do occur, are not, as
perceptions, themselves connections at all, but things,
objects, ... in precisely the same sense as the objects
between which - in a purely spacial sense of 'between' -
they are situated. ... obviously, a connection ...
(is a) relation between entities which are present to
the senses ••• as 'observable* as any other relation.
Necessity in the world of conceptions ... is known
to exist in precisely the same way as in the objective
world, that is to say by empirical observation ....
Let us assume to consider an example: ... how do we
know that (both that all men are mortal and that some
are not) is self-contradictory? «.. it constitutes a
case of the definition of self-contradiction. But
whether it constitutes a case of it is, again, a matter
of empirical observation.^
The argument here is that since a rope is not a connection, but
is an object like those between which it may be found, then no
connection is observable when we observe a rope; and since this
is the case, it is unfair to demand that a rope or a chain should
link acid-pouring with water-warming and then to declaim that no
connection is observable because there is no rope: even if there
were a rope, no connection would be observable. Then why say that
there is a connection along a rope, but not between the water and
the acid? Therefore (ad ignorantium) since we say that there is
a connection along the rope we may as well say that there is one
in the water-acid. Therefore there is one.
Curt J. Ducasse, Causation and the Tyoes of Necessity ,
p. 128.
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Then a connection is as observable as any other relation.
But Ducasse does not tell us the degree of this observability,
nor whether it varies.
The argument of Ducasse concerning conceptual necessity is
also somewhat unsound. Do Y/e look at two conceptions to see
whether they are in themselves contradictory, or to see whether
they reasonably are copies of either model contradictories and/or
some concept of contradiction? '/1/hat Ducasse means is that we
perceive the similarities between concept, model example, and
cases; and that these similarities are connections. But a simi-
larity is not a forcible connection maintained by some power, and
since it obtains between discretes, it is not a logical connec-
tion by the principle of unity.
Why did Hume not explore this possibility mentioned by
Ducasse, especially since Hume speaks of manner as sensibly-
founded? Possibly Hume wished to avoid talk of powers, since
powers (productive agencies) are unobservable and superfluous;
manner is more credible. Further, necessary connection, rather
than power, was the notion Hume disputed with the greater zeal.
For power produces motion by either other powers or by necessary
connection (as noted in the discussion of Leibniz); Hume attacks
necessary connection on the grounds that it is unobservable. He
is correct, unless we state necessary connection to be merely
constant conjunction, in which case the conjunction could be con-
stant merely by accident. But the concept of necessary connection
is considerably more lively than that of constant conjunction;
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the former entails ineluctability.
The skeptical position of Hume is difficult to contest, due
to its minimum of affirmations. For that reason, it can be said
against Hume only that his philosophy is an epitome of empiricism
clearly showing its features. One of these features is penury of
existences and consequent gauntness of reality. Such starvation
is disharmonious with the human propensity to believe in a rich
and complex universe.
This propensity produces beliefs of all sorts, one of which
is a belief in necessary connection. Hume regards necessary con-
nection as a gross leap beyond the given mere constant conjunc-
tion. But had he held, along somewhat the ideas of the thesis,
that "topographical models" exhibit "perceptual necessity," his
skepticism would not have been impaired. However, topographical
models are not adequate to explain necessary connection between,
say, dropping and falling; although "perceptual unity" does seem
adequate. Hume does not advance such a suggestion.
Necessary connection is a complex and obscure concept; if the
concept is fogged, the thing conceptualized cannot be known more
clearly. Perhaps Hume was avoiding this mist - but this oossl-
bility must be rejected when we consider that Hume speaks of time,
which is even more mysterious than necessary connection.
Hume^s position is only moderately close to that of the
thesis, although with the indicated extensions, Hume could have
Included "perceptual unity" and "perceptive necessity" in his
skepticism without damage to its strength.
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Leibniz
A truth is necessary when the opposite implies
contradiction, and when it is not necessary it is con-
tingent .... And God has chosen among an infinite num-
ber of possibles what he judged most fit. But since he
has chosen, it must be affirmed that everything is com-
prised in his choice and that nothing could be changed,
since he has once for all foreseen and regulated all,
he who could not regulate things piece-meal and by fits
and starts .... This is the necessity, which can now
be ascribed to things in the future, which is called
hypothetical or consequential necessity (that is to say,
founded upon the consequence of the hypothesis of the
choice made), which does not destroy the contingency of
things, and does not produce that absolute necessity
which contingency does not alter.
Nevertheless, although all the facts of the uni-
verse are now certain in relation to God, •.. it does
not follow that their connection is always truly neces-
sary; that is to say, that their truth, which pronounces
that one fact follows another, is necessary.^
The demonstration of this predicate (that Caesar
resolved to cross the Rubicon) is not as absolute as
those of number or of geometry, but presupposes the
series of things which God has chosen freely, and which
is founded on the first free decree of God, namely, to
do always what is most perfect, .... Now everything
which is founded on decrees of this kind is contingent,
although it is certain .... All contingent proposi-
tions have reasons for being as they are rather than
otherwise, or . . . they have a priori proofs of their
truth, which renders them certain, and show that the
connection of subject and predicate in these proposi-
tions has its foundation in the nature of the one and
the other; but they do not have demonstrations of neces-
sity, since these reasons are only founded on the prin-
ciple of contingency, or of the existence of things,
i.e. on what is or appears to be the best among several
possible things ....
As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there
are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one,
others to another, and each possible individual of any
world contains in its own notion the laws of its world.
G. W. Leibniz, Selections, p. 480.
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I think you will concede that not everything
possible exists ,,,. But when this is admitted, it
follows that it is not from absolute necessity, but
from some other reason (as good, order, perfection)
that some possibles obtain rather than others.^
"... it is one of the greatest principles of good sense that
nothing ever occurs without cause or determining reason, "2
And in truth we discover that everything takes
place in the world according to the laws of eternal
truths, not only geometrical but also metanhysical,
that is, not only according to material necessities,
but also according to formal reasons ••• but also by
descending to the special we see by a v;onderful plan
in all nature the metaphysical laws of cause, of power,
of action, have place, and these prevail over the
purely geometrical laws themselves of matter, ....^
There are doubtless a thousand irregularities, a
thousand disorders, in particulars. But it is impos-
sible that there should be any in the whole, ....
Now it is impossible that the entire universe should
not be well regulated, the prevailing perfection being
the reason for the existence of this system of things
in preference to any other possible system. Thus dis-
orders can appear only in the parts. In like manner
there are geometric lines in which there are irregular
parts, but when we consider the entire line, we find
it perfectly ordered according to its equation or gen-
eral nature.^
,., in spite of certain laws of change, a succeed-
ing state is in a certain manner only a copy of the
preceding, and to whatever anterior state you may go back
you will never find there a complete reason why there
is any world at all, and why this world rather than
another. And even if you imagine the world eternal,
nevertheless since you posit nothing but a succession of
states, and as you find a sufficient reason for them in
none of them whatsoever, and as any number of them
vifhatever does not aid you in giving a reason for them.
^ G. W. Leibniz, Selections , p, 94-5.
^ Ibid,, p. 482.
^ Ibid., p, 345-6.
^ Ibid., p, 189.
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it is evident that the reason must be sought else-
where. ... We must therefore pass from physical, or
hypothetical necessity, which determines the later
states by the former, to something which is of abso-
lute or metaphysical necessity, the reason for which
cannot be given,
1
For since the reason of the series is not found
in itself, as v;e have shown above, but must be sought
in metaphysical necessities or eternal truths, and
since that v/hioh exists can only come from that which
exists, as we have remarked above, eternal truths must
have their existence in a certain subject, absolutely
and metaphysically necessary, that is in God, through
whom those things, which othsrv/ise would be imaginary,
are realized.
^
And now we have physical necessity from meta-
physical, for although the world be not metaphysically
necessary, in the sense that its contrary implies a
contradiction or a logical absurdity, it is neverthe-
less physically necessary, or determined in such a way
that its contrary implies imperfection or moral
absurdity.^
As is clear from the above selections, Leibniz holds that
every state of the universe is related by law to the imm.ediately
preceding state, in such a way that by knowing the la?; and a
state, the succeeding state may be predicted. This is not an un-
common philosophical position. But the question is not that
there is rule of law, but whether in addition to the Humian con-
tiguity there is not only law, but also some Ineluctable power
which enforces the law, Hume tells us that we observe contiguity
and nothing else; vi^e do not know laws or powers to enforce the
laws. But Leibniz, with Berkeley, holds that the relation
G. W. Leibniz, Selections
, p. 345-6.
^ Ibid., p. 349.
^ Ibid ., p. 348.
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between law and compliance with the law is established by the
power of divine decree.
But if power is added to the relation, then how is this to
be known; what is the power like? And why do we invoke powers;
is power a convenient explanation for regularity, as gravity is
for falling?
We know gravity only by its effects. But v/hat are the ef-
fects of the powers? The two examples are not precisely anal-
ogous, although both are cases springing from the same root as
produces the following model: "Hmmm - fox tracks, I'll go
fox-hunting." And the hunter seeks a little animal. But can we
expect to find gravity or the divine causal power in this kind
of manner? For the causal power, our clues are expressed by the
words "contiguity," "constant conjunction," "perfection,"
"harmony," "order," "regularity"; with the polars "chaos," "dis-
order," and "cacophony."
Ifl there not a difference between the meanings of "order"
and "contiguity?" "Contiguity" is clearly closely related to the
perception of visual objects, v;hile "crder" aprlie? also to ob-
jects of touch and hearing. "Order" is also more generally
applied to non-sensory objects; we do not say that someone has a
contiguous mind. There is no adverb form of "contiguous." The
point is fairly obvious, namely that there is a gradation of the
amount of abstraction to be found in our expressions of order -
from a well-kept lawn to a self-consistent geometry. The bugbear
here is that since the concrete portions of our oonceots have
}
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referents, we think that the abstract portions are similarly
represented in some kind of abstract reality.
Such thinking leads to a host of disreputable intellectual
activity. Thus the ideas of pov/ers, laws, and onlversals are
often treated as versions of things which exist is sharply as do
stones. We are cautioned against such thinking in a proverb at-
tributed to J. J. Thompson, "'^iuantum theory should be a policy
instead of a creed."
Leibniz may be suspected of such thinking, due to his
urgency to explain away the thousand irregularities. But aside
from all such objections, he ignores a regress which appears when
one speaks of powers enforcing causal laws: what is the relation
between the law and the power? Is it merely constant conjunction,
or is there some further power to enforce that the first power
can indeed enforce the law? And powers without end? Of course
the power in the cause could be defined to be adequate, but this
would be reification.
The thesis attempts to avoid regress by speaking of unity.
For example: I lift a stone. The muscular stress is felt as
the stone ascends; if I reduce the tension, the stone descends
or falls. The reduction of effort is part of the cause; the
descent is the effect. Presumably, the descent comes as one
force overcomes another; the unity springs from the presence of
the felt muscular tension during both lifting and lowering, or
exoressed abstractly, both forces are present in lifting and
falling.
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If powers are invoked so as to avoid the regress, they must
be assiraulated to unity as indicated above,
Leibniz does not suffer greatly from these objections, for to
accuse of regress is not to destroy; everyone who believes in the
past believes in a regress. But to disbelieve the past is so
bizarre that it may be called an impossible belief, while dis-
belief in causal powers is not so unlikely. Regress is no solu-
tion to problems of origin. But the need for the past covers any
objections made on grounds of regress; however there is no such
need for causal powers and therefore no corresponding acceptance
of regress,
Leibniz very nearly sneaks of unity of the type propounded
by the thesis, as seen in his handling of the "thousand dis-
orders," The well-regulated whole apparently is so well regu-
lated that there is no need for controlling agencies, as no law
against cannibalism is necessary in New York City, And since
there are no conflicting elements to require suppression, the
word "regulation" is somewhat a misnomer: there is nothing to be
regulated, due to the pervasive unity. By a small extension of
his notion of consistency of this world, and with reflection that
the other possible universes do not exist and hence do not offer
conflict, Leibniz could have produced a world-view differing from
the thesis only in the hierarchy of laws, and God, and the value
he assigns to this world. But of course, if all is one, then
nothing can be said about the one, for there is nothing with which
it may be compared. Had Leibniz agreed, then I can see no point
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where the two viev/s would have been different.
Kant
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason attempts broadly to harmonize
rationalism v;ith empiricism, the attempt consisting of a presen-
tation of a priori prerequisites for experience. Specifically in
application to causal necessity, Kant holds that some sequences
of perceptions are objectively founded, irreversible by us, and
therefore necessarily interconnected.
The elaborate ar.§ument of the Critique opens with a discus-
sion of space and time:
"These (extension and figure) belong to pure intuition, which,
without any actual object of the senses or of sensation, exists in
the mind as an a priori form of sensibility. "*•
. . . but there is nevertheless a determinate form
(namely, time) in which alone the intuition of inner
states is possible, and everything which belongs to
inner determination is therefore represented in rela-
tion of time.^
"Space is not an empirical concept which haq been derived
from outer experiences."*^
"Tpace is a necessa-^y a priori representation, which under-
lies all outer intuitions. "^
Space is nothing but the form of all aopearances
of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of
^ Iinmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason , B 35.
2 Ibid ., B 38.
^ Loo , cit .
^ Ibid., B 39.
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sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is pos-
sible for us. Since, then, the receptivity of the sub-
ject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must
necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it
can be readily understood how the form of all appear-
ances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and
so exist in the mind a priori , and how, as a pure in-
tuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can
contain, prior to all experience, principles which de-
termine the relations of these objects,^
Kant states substantially the same opinion regarding time,
and prepares for the extension of this complex of a priori prin-
ciples to include the content of concepts, or a priori sensibility,
with the purpose of introducing the categories of experience.
The skeptical position, and Kant's strategic plan against it:
If we thought to escape these toilsome enquiries
by saying that experience continually presents examples
of such regularity among appearances and so affords
abundant opportunity of extracting the concept of cause,
and at the same time of verifying the objective valid-
ity of such a concept, we should be overlooking the
fact that the concept of cause can never arise in this
manner. It must either be grounded comijletely a priori
in the understanding, or must be entirely given up as a
mere phamtom of the brain. For this concept makes
strict demand that something. A, should be such that
something else, B, follows from it necessarily and in ac-
cordance with an absolutely universal rule. Apnearances
do indeed present cases from which a rule can be ob-
tained according to which something usually happens, but
they never prove the sequence to be necessary. To the
synthesis of cause and effect there belongs a dignity
which cannot be empirically expressed, namely, that the
effect not only succeeds upon the cause, but that it is
posited through it and arises out of it. This strict
universality of the rule is never a characteristic of
empirical rules; they can acquire through induction
only comparative universality, that is extensive ap-
plicability.
^
^ Ibid., B 42.
^ Ibid., B 123.
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The question now arises whether a priori concepts
do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which
alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thoutJjht as
object in general. In that case all empirical knowl-
edge of objects would necessarily conform to such con-
cepts, because only as thus presupposing them is any-
thing possible as object of experience. Now all exper-
ience does indeed contain,... a concept of an object as
being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing.
Concepts of objects in general thus underlie all empir-
ical knowledge as its a priori conditions.... The ob-
jective validity of the categories as a priori concepts
rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form
of thought is concerned, through them alone does exper-
ience become possible. They relate of necessity and a
priori to objects of experience, for the reason that
only by means of them can any object whatsoever of ex-
perience be thought.!
Kant next argues for a classification of experience as objective
or subjective, so as to avoid an objection which otherwise would
become troublesome in his discussion of successions in the
"Second Analogy."
It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany
all my representations: for otherwise something would
be represented in me which could not be thought at all,
and that is equivalent to saying that the representa-
tion would be impossible, or at least would be nothing
to me. That representation which can be given prior
to all thought i£ entitled intuition. All the manifold
of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to
the "I think" in the same subject Ir which this mani-
fold is found. But this representation is an act of
spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belong-
ing to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to
distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again,
original apperception, because it is that self-
consciousness which, v/hile generating the representa-
tion "I think" (a representation which must be capable
of accompanying all other representations, and which
in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot
itself be accompanied by any further representation.
The unity of this apperception, I likewise entitle the
transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order
Ibid., B 126.
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to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge
arising from it.^
I do not here assert that these representations
(in the judg-nent, 'bodies are heavy' ) necessarily be-
long to one another in the empirical intuition, but
that they belong to one another in virtue of the
necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of
intuitions, ...^
After further repetitions of the assertion that a priori
entities enable us to have experience, Kant then offers three
"Analogies of Experience," the second of which is pertinent. Its
thesis may be casually stated as being that some successions of
perceptions are not capricious wanderings of our senses, but are
perceptions of a succession. These perceptions of successions
are known by the irreversibility of their time-order.
The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is
always successive. The representations of the parts
follow upon one another. vVhether they also follow one
another in the object is a point which calls for fur-
ther reflection, and which is not decided by the above
statement. Everything, .,, may be entitled object. ...
since we have to deal solely with our representations,
we could never determine from the succession of the
representations how their manifold may be connected in
the object. ... For instance, the apprehension of the
manifold in the appearance of a house which atands be-
fore me is successive. The question then arises,
whether the manifold of the house is also in itself
successive. This, however, is v/hat no one will grant.
... kVhat, then, are we to understand by the question:
how the manifold may be connected in the appeai^ance
itself, which yet is nothing in itself?^
Fvery apprehension of an event is therefore a per-
ception that follows upon another perception. But
since, as I have above illustrated by reference to the
^ Ibid., B 13S.
2 Ibid ., B 142.
^ Ibid.^ B 235.
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appearance of a house, this likewise happens in all
synthesis of apnrehension, the apprehension of an
event is not yet thereby distinguished from other
apprehensions. But, as I also note, in an appearance
which contains a happening (the preceding state of
the perception we may entitle A, and the succeeding
B) B can be apprehended only as following upon k; the
perception A cannot follow upon B but only precede
it. For instance, I see a ship move downstream. My
perception of its lower position follows upon the
perception of its position higher up in the stream,
and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this
appearance the ship should first be perceived lower
down in the stream and afterwards higher up. The
order in which the perceptions succeed one another in
apprehension is in this instance determined, and to
this order apprehension is bound down. In the previous
example of a house my perceptions could begin with the
apprehension of the roof and end with the basement, or
could begin from below and end above; and I could simi-
larly apprehend the manifold of the empirical In-
tuition either from right to left or from left to
right, ,.. But in the perception of an event there is
always a rule that makes the order in which the per-
ceptions ••• follow upon one another a necessary
order. -^
Kant here has committed a petitio principii, offering us no
reasons why a house is not perceived as is a boat-motion, except
for the variable order of house-perceptions.
In this case, therefore, we must derive the sub-
jective succession of ap-orehension from the objective
succession of appearances. Otherwise the order of ap-
prehension is utterly undetermined, and does not dis-
tinguish one apoearance from another. Since the sub-
jective succession by itself is altogether arbitrary,
it does not prove anything as to the manner in which
the manifold is connected in the object. The objective
succession will therefore consist in that order of the
manifold of appearance according to which, in con-
formity with a rule, the apprehension of that which
hapoens follows upon the apprehension of that which
precedes. Thus only can I be justified in asserting,
not merely of my apprehension, but of appearance itself,
that a succession is to be met within it. This is only
another way of saying that I cannot arrange the appre-
hension otherwise than in this very succession.
•^ Ibid., B 238.
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In conformity v/itb Buch a rule there must lie in
that which precedes an event the condition of a rule
according to which this event invariably and neces-
sarily follows. I cannot reverse this order, pro-
ceeding back from the event to determine through ap-
prehension that which precedes, ... The advance, on
the other hand, from a given time to the determinate
time that follows is a necessary advance. Therefore
since there is certainly something which follows,
... ,1 must refer it necessarily to something else
which precedes it and upon which it follows in con-
formity with a rule, that is, of necessity.^
If, then, we experience that something happens,
we in so doing always presuppose that something pre-
cedes it, on which it follows according to a rule.
Otherwise I should not say of the object that it
follows,"
Kant here falls into the Pickwickian fallacy: common usage
does not imply that when something follows It follows according
to a rule.
Understanding is required for all experience and
for its possibility. Its primary contribution does
not consist in making the representation of objects
distinct, but in making the representation of an object
possible at all. This it does by carrying the time-
order over into the appearances and their existence.
For to each of thera, as consequent, it assigns, through
relation to the preceding apoearances, a position de-
termined a priori in time. Otherwise, they would not
accord with time itself, which a_ priori determines the
position of all its parts. Now since absolute time is
not an object of perception, this determination of po-
sition cannot be derived from the relation of appear-
ances to it. On the contrary, the appearances must
determine for one another their position in time, and
make their time-order a necessary order,3
Time a priori positions its parts, and therefore successive
appearances are positioned In time. And since time is not an
* Ibid., B P39.
^ Ibid., B 240.
^ Ibid ., B 245.
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object of perception, neither are time-orders of appearance.
There are many picayune objections which may be applied to
Kant*s argumentation. However, the value of his general thought
is more properly our concern; is Kant's notion of mental keyholes
adequate for imputing causal necessity into the world?
Rationalism and empiricism each before Kant had attempted to
impute such necessity. Rationalism characterized the attempt of
Leibniz, while the classic empirical and skeptical position was
advanced by Hume.
Empiricism is alluring because of its avoidance of meta-
physical squabbles; empiricism is at the root of common sense, in
conflict with ways of thinking which produce superstitions and
wishful thinking. Supposedly, empiricism is the way to truth, by
freeing us from subjectivity.
But empiricism is not sufficiently compelling to assuage our
feeling that there is something unseen lurking behind the jumble
of sense-impressions; this feeling is expressed variously by
concepts such as mind, God, form, substance, cause, self, beauty,
and a myriad of others: all of them are difficult to explain
with empiricism. Further, a belief in sollipsism is the product
of the empiricist habit; in this there is a chaos of scattered
m'=»ntal contents. The empiricist cannot explain space or time,
nor even exactly what things he affirms to exist.
Can the rationalist fare better? Not really, for he only
removes the troublesome problems of the empiricist to a foggy
realm, so that he may say, for example, that there is_ a self.
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even though we know very little about it. Rationalists also have
disputes among themselves concerning v;hat is real and what is not
(of. Kant, "Antinomies of Pure Reason,'' in his Critique )
«
The resolution of this tangle of problems would seem to be a
synthesis of the merits of the two approaches, Kent attempted
this; and how should we judge his product, by self-consistency,
or usefulness, or efficiency of structure?
Hume seems to have driven away too much of the world;
Leibniz to have invented too much, in his zeal to explain away
the less pleasant features of our existence. Neither Hume nor
Leibniz is consanguinous with the Kantian moderation, and neither
do they seem to possess the sweeping range and comprehension of
Kant: each denies propositions Kant allows.
But Kant's moderation, while avoiding the troublesome ex-
tremes of Hume and Leibniz, is not Kant's only appeal, *Ahat in-
creases the value of his rationalistic thought is that his en-
tities are natural functions of our biological-electrical structure
rather than being static lav/s, or immaterial stuffs, or any other
mysteries. Tl'iere is nothing about the categories more unworldly
than there is about any of our other capacities,
Hov/aver, after such an exemplary approach, Kant in the
"Second Analogy" of the Critique disappoints us with several
petitios occurring at critical points. However, there is no ob-
vious way to improve his argument. It may very well be that space
and time are a priori mental denizens - but causal necessity seems
to be more closely related to ideas evolved from constant
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conjunction by mental habits, as Hume holds. For hov; do we know
a series of perceptions to be irreversible'' Only by induction.
And as Schopenhauer points out, a melody is irreversible, but
there is no causal connection between the notes. Night follows
days, and no causal connection is established there. This is the
crucial point, for with no irreversibility there is no necessity.
Kant gives us no test for irreversibility.
Is this a serious flaw" Perhaps it appears so, until we re-
flect that since only the past is known irreversible, no test may
be applied to the future. Kant exploits this, saying in B 165
that
Special lav/s, as concerning those appearances
which are empirically determined, cannot in their spe-
cific character be derived from the categories, al-
though they are one and all subject to them. To obtain
any knov/ledge v/hatsoever of these special laws, we must
resort to experience; but it is the a priori laws that
alone can instruct us in regard to experience in gen-
eral, and as to what it is that can be known as an
object of experience.
This maneuver affirms the truth of the general principle of
causality, yet allows our mistakes in saying which situations are
and which are not causal. (Leibniz similarly cavalierly dismisses
his thousand disorders.)
Kant presents nothing resembling the thesis "pei^ceptual
unity"; his "synthetic unity of apperception" is the result of a
mental function, v/hlle "perceptual unity" is a feature of the
world independent of our mental functions. Here, in his zeal to
avoid objectionable metaphysical imputations into experience,
Kant has perhaps overlooked the possibility that not only are we
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disposed to perceive the world in certain ways, but that the world
is structured in itself according to those ways, therefore we add
or delete nothing by perceiving the world according to the con-
fines of the categories. Were this his position, his indication
of unity implicit in the world would produce much the same idea
as that which the thesis names "perceptual unity."
Certainly for perceiving obvious unities, such as that of a
smokestack, Kant would agree with the thesis. But for more ab-
stract unities, such as that joining the functions of smokestacks
with those of factories, Kant would become reluctant to admit that
the unities were in the world, and eager to place them in the
understanding. Here I would diverge, and maintain that the most
extreme unity-abstraction, namely the unity of everything, is a
feature of the world, although since the commonplace unities
(as of a tabletop) usually engage completely our activities, we
rarely consider the more abstruse ones. Consider the unity of a
musical work; if the unity were in our minds then how may works
of the same form, and by the same composer, be said to have dif-
ferent intensities of unity? Unity is more easily explained by
finding some of it in the world than all of it in our imagination.
Yet Kant invents the categories. The thesis invents nothing
since unity already exists; unity is placed in objects rather than
in the mind. In this sense, Kant's universe is more subjective
than the thesis; the universe of the thesis presents a featureless




"But it is absurd to call an object the cause of another
object."^
"••• they (the primary forces of nature) alone (are those)
by which changes or effects become possible; for they alone give
causality to causes, «.. m2
The present ... hurled the pre
bottomless pit of the past, not thr
immediately, through its mere exist
ence was nevertheless inevitable,
make this comprehensible or even cl
conception; we recognize it, on the
directly and instinctively, just as
difference between right and left •
glove will not fit our right hand.
ceding ••• into the
ough causality, but
ence, which exlst-
It is impossible to
ear by means of mere
contrary, quite
we recognize the
• • that our left
All our representations stand toward one another
in a regulated connection; which may be determined
^ priori , .... It is this connection which is expressed
by the principle of sufficient reason in its general-
ity.
^
Now, as the law of causality is known to us
a priori , and is therefore a transcendental law, . .
•
the relation between cause and effect is a necessary
one, so that the causal law authorizes us to form hypo-
thetical judgments,^
It is only when the Understanding begins to act -
...
- only when it begins to apply its sole form, the
causal lav/, that a powerful transformation takes place,
by v/hich subjective sensation becomes objective per-
ception.^















Not long ago I had some long curtains put up at
my bedroom window, which reached down to the floor, and
which were drawn aside from the center by means of a
string. The first morning after they were opened, I
was surprised to see my dog, a very intelligent poodle,
standing quite perplexed, and looking upwards and side-
wards for the cause of the phenomenon: that is, he was
seeking for the change which he knew a priori must have
taken place,
A very young puppy will not ••• jump off a table,
because he foresees what will be the consequence.
But the process (of understanding) consists
throughout in referring from g;iven effects to their
causes, .... The very fact that we presuppose causality
in this process, proves precisely that this law must
have been supplied by the Understanding itself, for it
could never have found its way into the intellect from
outside. It is indeed the first condition of all em-
pirical perception, . ,2
"Necessity has no other true and distinct meaning than that
of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is
posited. "3
Schopenhauer strongly resembles Kant. His example of the
puzzled dog illustrates with extraordinary clarity the a priori
nature of the belief in causal connection. The similar nature of
necessary connection, and the remarkable likeness of his view to
that of the thesis' "perceptual unity" will be exemplified by the
following passages.
After stating Euclid's proof of Theorem Six, Book I of the
Elements , Schopenhauer proceeds:
But who bases his conviction of that geometrical
truth upon this proof? Do we not rather base our
' Ibid ., p, 89.




conviction upon the reason of being, which we know
intuitively, and according to which two lines drawn
from both extremes of another line, and inclining
equally toward one another, can only meet at a point
which is equally distant from both extremities; since
the two arising angles are properly but one, to
which the oppositeness of position gives the appear-
ance of being two, wherefore there is no reason why
the lines should meet at any point nearer to the one
end than to the other .^
Without this intellectual operation (understand-
ing via causality) for which the forms must lie ready
within us, the perception of an objective external
world could never arise from a mere sensation within
our skin.
2
Schopenhauer next presents a diagram which he holds to be
an immediately obvious proof of the Pythagorean theorem. The
diagram is a substitute for the verbal proof usually offered,
and for this special case is better to comprehend and possible
more rigorous:
This type of proof is an exact example of "perceptive neces'
sity," as the term is coined, defined, and used in the thesis.
Ibid
., p. 161.
A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, p. 37,
1C9
Schopenhauer precisely coincides in this original concept, al-
though there are differences in the tv/o expositions. In addition,
there is a difference in the attached significance.
According tc the thesis, the necessity in "perceptive neces-
sity" arises from "perceptual unity"; in the diagram the unity is
apparent as our attention flickers from form to form, atomic and
molecular. Schopenhauer states merely that it arises "quite
directly and instinctively." Further, as we have already noted,
Schopenhauer defines necessity as having "no other true and dis-
tinct meaning than that of the infallibility of the consequence
when the reason is posited." But there is no reason and no con-
sequence ansrwhore in the diagram, yet Schopenhauer claims the
power of proof for it. It may be inferred that he has not given
the matter more thought than to call it intuitive, direct, in-
stinctive. And for the physical world apart from raathomatical
proofs, his examples of the behavior of dogs his view that
causality in the world is also intuitive, direct, and instinctive.
no
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The purpose of this thesis is to find a justification for
the belief in causality. However, this does not mean that every
change has a cause, and argument is offered to show that it is
not possible for every change to have a cause.
One would like science to be as certain as is mathematics
and analytic truth. This thesis maintains that such "deductive
necessity" is comprehensible only by transmutation into "per-
ceptive necessity" which is a feature of "topographical models"
such as Venn diagrams. In comprehending such an analytic state-
ment as "bachelors are unmarried," the necessity is known through
abstractions from topographical models.
Perceptive necessity does not require the use of language
for its comprehension; it is a feature of the world as are colors,
shapes, and sizes. No language is needed to see the perceptive
necessity that if circle a is in circle B, and B in C, then A is
in C, Perceptive necessity is linguistically expressed by "a
thing is necessarily what it is," but language is not required
for the perception of this fact.
To say, using language, that A is A is to express a tau-
tology, which is necessarily true. Then to say "A is A" IS NOT
ONLY TO SAY TPIAT A is A, but also that necessarily A is A, Then
let it not be objected that to the statement "circle A is in
circle B" it is vacuous to add that such is necessarily the case
merely since such is the case, for this addition is allowed to
the tautology.
Unity of appearances is not entirely a linguistic affair,
for (to take an extreme case) else the mystic could tell us what
he means by such utterances as "the universe is One." Whether
something is regarded as a unity or as an amorphous heap of parts
depends upon one's interests of the moment.
All changes are from one thing into something which is simi-
lar in at least one respect; such are called "XtoX'" changes.
A complete and utter change would be symbolized as XtoY, but
there are none such. One uses the idea of XtoY changes to ex-
press finality; but the presence of the corpse makes death not
an XtoY change, but an Xto X' change. Then there is unity be-
tween the thing which changes and that into which it changes.
This unity is a matter of perception, as with the mystic. It is
also a matter of perception that united things are the same.
Language makes the addition that united things are necessarily
the same, but this necessity also is perceived as are the united
things
.
Causal changes can be of the XtoX' variety (the pulling and
consequent motion of opening a door can be regarded as a unity).
Therefore in such cases there is necessity between cause and
effect.


